Analyse experiment results

o: Priya Nair, Head of Growth**

Do not ship B to 100% on Monday. Return new traffic to A, continue following existing test cohorts and test a revised page with clearer pricing. B improves conversion, but the readout does not meet the conditions we agreed for rollout.

The conversion lift is credible: +1.3 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval of +0.6 to +2.0. However, conversion alone cannot establish that B creates better customer or business outcomes.

The guardrails do not support launch. Reported day-30 retention falls 4.5pp against a maximum permitted decline of 2pp. Its confidence interval includes declines within our tolerance, so we cannot say the true loss definitively exceeds 2pp.¹ Equally, we have not established that B is within tolerance.

Refund requests rose from 212 to 301, or 42%, against a 10% limit. Confirm whether the agreed guardrail measures counts or rates, using comparable denominators and observation windows. B generates more paying customers, which could explain some additional requests, but the increase warrants investigation before expansion.

There is also a measurement issue: a 21-day test cannot give every participant 30 days of follow-up. Establish when this readout was produced, which cohorts matured and how retention is defined across monthly and annual plans². If measured immediately after the test, the day-30 figures cannot be complete.

Revenue per trial is only $0.19 higher, with uncertainty spanning zero. That does not establish a revenue benefit, and annual billing up front makes it especially important to distinguish cash collected from earned revenue and account for refunds.

B’s presentation offers a plausible explanation worth testing: “$9.99/month” may attract customers who do not understand the $119.99 upfront commitment. The readout does not prove this; inspect refund reasons and results by plan.

For the next test, display “$119.99 billed annually, equivalent to $9.99/month” prominently and keep the $14.99 monthly option readily visible. Retain the original guardrails and define mature cohort reporting before launch.

For Monday, the defensible decision is simple: the conversion gain earns further testing, but does not justify overriding our agreed customer safeguards.

Hi Priya,

Recommendation: Do not ship Variant B to 100% on Monday. While it improves trial-to-paid conversion, it severely breaches our pre-agreed guardrails on both retention and refund requests, threatening long-term revenue health.

Here is the reasoning to defend holding off on Monday:

• Guardrail Breach on Retention: We agreed in advance that Day-30 paid retention must not drop by more than 2 percentage points. Variant B’s retention dropped by 4.5pp¹ (down to 79.5% from A's 84.0%, with a 95% CI of −7.9 to −1.1). This massive drop indicates we are converting users who aren’t genuinely committed to the subscription.²
• Severe Spike in Refunds: Refund requests jumped by 42% (301 requests for B vs. 212 for A), completely shattering our guardrail limit that refunds must not rise by more than 10%. This confirms that Variant B’s presentation³—leading with the $9.99/month equivalent and hiding the monthly plan—creates subscriber confusion or misleading expectations at checkout.
• Neutral Long-Term Revenue: Although Variant B boosts initial trial-to-paid conversion (+1.3pp) and shows a nominal lift in day-30 revenue per trial start ($9.61 vs. $9.42), the confidence interval crosses zero. Combined with the steep drop in retention and surge in refunds, the initial revenue gains are illusory⁴ and will likely erode over time.

Next Steps: Keep Variant A live. Instruct the growth team to iterate on the pricing presentation—addressing the confusion around the annual plan framing—without sacrificing user retention or triggering buyer remorse.

Recommendation: Do not ship Variant B. Keep Variant A live and do not roll B out to 100% on Monday.

While Variant B delivered an initial +1.3pp lift in trial-to-paid conversion, it violates both pre-agreed guardrails, creates bill shock, and delivers no statistically significant revenue upside.

Here is the reasoning to defend this decision on Monday:

1. Both Pre-Agreed Guardrails Were Blown

We agreed on strict risk thresholds before launch. Variant B failed both: * Day-30 Retention: Fell −4.5pp (down to 79.5%), more than double our maximum allowed drop of 2pp (95% CI: −7.9 to −1.1). * Refund Requests: Surged +42% (301 vs. 212), four times our 10% ceiling.

Overriding guardrails after the fact sets a dangerous precedent and invites compounding churn.

2. The Conversion Lift Is an Illusion Driven by Bill Shock

Variant B hides the monthly tier and frames the annual plan as “$9.99/month.” Users clearly believe they are committing to a flexible monthly rate, only to be charged $119.99 upfront. The 42% spike in refunds and immediate drop in 30-day retention prove that these are not high-intent, qualified subscribers—they are confused customers who churn or dispute the charge as soon as they review their statements.

3. Long-Term Economics Are Flat to Negative

• Day-30 revenue per trial start is statistically unchanged: $9.61 for B vs. $9.42 for A (CI crosses zero).
• When factored against the operational cost of processing 42% more refunds, payment dispute fees, customer support load, and downstream LTV decay from lower retention, Variant B will be net-negative over a 12-month horizon.
• App store ratings and brand trust will also suffer if users perceive our checkout flow as deceptive.

Next Step

Iterate on Variant C: keep the focus on annual plan value, but make the upfront billing explicit (e.g., “$9.99/mo, billed annually at $119.99”) and test clear annual vs. monthly side-by-side positioning rather than hiding the monthly option.