Tasks / Strategy

Develop product strategy

Can the model make a coherent choice grounded in the evidence, rather than list aspirations?

Task type v1.1 · 2 tasksLast changed 6 Oct 2026 · ChangelogDifficulty

What AI gets right here, and what you’ll still have to catch

From 16 graded outputs by 8 models. 38% were usable with at most a quick edit.

Reliably right

  1. Produces the required deliverable100% pass
    Complete strategy document in the requested form, length, and for the named reader; the board could act on it.
    GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT · Supply or demand for a stalled marketplace
  2. Diagnosis before prescription100% pass
    Diagnosis: students can't find the right tutor; actions (intake, recommendations, rematch, manual matching) directly address it.
    GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT · Supply or demand for a stalled marketplace
  3. Tells the CEO plainly100% pass
    It clearly states the enterprise-first plan is wrong for next year, backs it with numbers, and presents the alternative.
    GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT · Enterprise, says the CEO

Where it slips

  1. Names an advantage that's hard to copy11% pass
    Does not name a benefit and a barrier that a well-funded competitor couldn't copy; no moat is identified.
    GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT · Supply or demand for a stalled marketplace
  2. Proposes tests that could fail42% pass
    The SMB pilot lacks a numeric threshold for success; while the payback guardrail has a threshold and action, not every proposed test/gate meets the full requirement.
    GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT · Enterprise, says the CEO
  3. Avoids unsupported claims44% pass
    Presents 'root cause: we've let the loudest requests set the roadmap' and 'SMB remains our top-of-funnel' as facts without labelling them as hypotheses or citing evidence.
    Haiku 5.5 · API · Enterprise, says the CEO

How it’s graded

Each check is built on how world-class product and growth leaders do this work, as they’ve described it on Lenny’s Podcast, and names the leader it comes from.

  1. Diagnosis before prescription

    Does the strategy name the crux, the specific obstacle or opportunity the evidence points to, and do the proposed actions follow from that diagnosis?

    Passes when States one crux grounded in the supplied evidence, and each major action visibly addresses it.

  2. Names an advantage that's hard to copy

    Does the strategy say what will make its position hard for an informed, well-funded competitor to copy (a benefit customers value plus a barrier to copying it), rather than relying on being first, on features, or on funding?

    Passes when Names the benefit and the barrier, and why a capable competitor couldn't simply replicate it.

  3. Says what it gives up

    Does the strategy name what the company will stop doing, or deliberately not do, in order to pursue it?

    Passes when Names at least one real thing being dropped or declined, with the reason it loses out.

Plus our standard checks

Uses the supplied evidence correctly · Addresses the actual decision · Respects explicit constraints · Identifies material uncertainty · Avoids unsupported claims · Produces the required deliverable · Proposes tests that could fail · and 2 written for each task, which you’ll see in the tasks below.

The tasks

Read the brief, then compare up to three outputs, each with the LLM judge’s verdict on every check. Highlights mark what a PM had to fix.

The brief

You're the VP Product at Cadence. Our CEO wants a strategy for next year the exec team can rally behind, and believes it's enterprise (the note is below). Write the strategy memo, in no more than 1,200 words: the diagnosis, the guiding policy (where we play and what we stop), the coherent actions for next year, and how we'll know it's working. Tell the CEO if you think they're wrong. The files are attached.

What the model was given6 items: About Cadence, ceo_note.md, unit_economics_by_segment.csv, enterprise_detail.md, mid_market_detail.md, smb_detail.md
About CadenceStaff scheduling and time tracking, sold to businesses with hourly workers.
ceo_note.md1 lines · Download
From the CEO: "I want a strategy for next year that the exec team can rally behind. I believe it's enterprise. Tell me if I'm wrong."
unit_economics_by_segment.csv3 rows · Download
segment,customers,avg_arr_usd,gross_margin_pct,support_cost_per_customer_year_usd,cac_usd,payback_months,net_revenue_retention_pct,logo_churn_year_pct
SMB self-serve,6200,1100,78,610,740,31,88,34
Mid-market,890,14500,81,1900,9800,9,118,7
Enterprise,34,96000,64,21000,118000,26,104,9
enterprise_detail.md4 lines · Download
# Enterprise detail

- Average sales cycle: 9 months. 5 of the last 8 deals needed custom features (built by the core team, about 14 engineer-weeks each).
- The CEO's plan: "Win enterprise. Hire 10 enterprise AEs and a solutions team, and build SSO, audit logs and custom workflows this year."
mid_market_detail.md5 lines · Download
# Mid-market detail

- Best-retaining segment. Expansion comes from adding locations and seats.
- Top requests: multi-location reporting, payroll integrations, shift templates.
- Win rate against our main competitor: 61%.
smb_detail.md4 lines · Download
# SMB self-serve detail

- 62% of support tickets come from SMB accounts. Free trial converts at 4%.
- Most SMB customers are on the $79/month plan with unlimited phone support.
What a strong answer doesThe answer key the graders mark against

Diagnoses from the unit economics: mid-market is the engine (payback 9 months, NRR 118%, churn 7%, wins 61% against the main competitor); SMB self-serve loses money once support and churn are counted (about $1,100 a year at 78% gross margin is about $860, minus $610 of support, leaves about $250 a year against $740 to acquire, with 34% leaving each year; payback 31 months, NRR 88%) and generates 62% of tickets; enterprise is slow and expensive (payback 26 months, 64% gross margin, 9-month cycles, 5 of 8 deals needing about 14 engineer-weeks of custom work). Tells the CEO the enterprise bet is wrong for next year: it would pull the core team into custom work and stretch payback. Policy: win mid-market, expanding on locations and seats; stop subsidising SMB support (change the plan or pricing, self-serve support, raise the entry price) rather than abandon it; serve enterprise only where it buys the product as is. Coherent actions: mid-market roadmap (multi-location reporting, payroll integrations, shift templates), SMB support and pricing changes, no custom enterprise work. Names what it gives up and how it'll know (mid-market NRR and payback, SMB support cost per customer).

Critical failures (cap the score at 40)
  • Recommends hiring the enterprise team and building custom workflows as next year's main strategy
Task

Staff-level · v1.0

The outputs

8 setups answered this brief.

Usable with a quick edit10 of 12 checks passed

The memo is evidence-based, clear, and actionable; a PM could adopt it with minor wording tweaks without re-verifying facts or redoing the analysis.

Output

Cadence: Next Year’s Strategy

To: CEO and Executive Team From: VP Product Decision: Make multi-location mid-market businesses our growth engine—not enterprise.

1. Diagnosis: Our constraint is focus, not deal size

I believe the enterprise-first plan is wrong for next year. Enterprise may become an attractive market, but our current evidence does not justify hiring ten enterprise AEs or orienting the roadmap around their deals.

Cadence has three materially different businesses:

SegmentCurrent ARR*Reported CAC paybackNRRAnnual logo churn
------:---:---:---:
SMB self-serve$6.82M31 months88%34%
Mid-market$12.91M9 months118%7%
Enterprise$3.26M26 months104%9%

Customers × average ARR.

Mid-market already generates 56% of ARR. It combines our best retention, strongest expansion, fastest acquisition payback, and highest gross margin, at 81%. A 61% win rate against our main competitor suggests a defensible product advantage. Expansion through locations and seats gives us a repeatable growth mechanism.

Enterprise offers larger contracts, but not yet a better business. Gross margin is 64%, the sales cycle averages nine months, and five of the last eight deals required custom development. Those five deals consumed approximately 70 engineer-weeks. Hiring sellers before fixing this delivery model risks scaling commitments faster than reusable product capability.

SMB is a different problem: substantial revenue with weak retention and disproportionate service demand. It generates 62% of support tickets; annual support cost averages $610 against $1,100 in ARR. Unlimited phone support on a $79 monthly plan is misaligned with self-service economics. A 4% trial conversion rate compounds the acquisition problem.

The central challenge is therefore allocating scarce product, engineering, and commercial capacity toward repeatable, retained revenue. Enterprise customization and SMB service demands are drawing capacity away from the segment where our model works best.

2. Guiding policy: Win multi-location mid-market

Where we play

Our primary customer is a mid-market business with hourly workers across multiple locations, where scheduling consistency, consolidated visibility, and payroll handoffs create recurring operational pain.

Our promise: make running the next location easier than running the first.

We will deepen that advantage and turn successful initial deployments into additional locations and seats. We will first target industries and acquisition channels where our own mid-market cohorts show the strongest retention and payback; the supplied evidence does not yet support choosing a specific vertical.

Enterprise remains a selective adjacency. SMB remains a supported, increasingly self-service business—not our primary acquisition investment.

What we stop

  • Do not approve the ten-enterprise-AE hiring plan or a dedicated solutions-team buildout.
  • Stop letting individual enterprise deals dictate core-team custom workflows.
  • Do not commit to the entire enterprise feature bundle. SSO and audit logs must earn priority through demonstrated, reusable demand—not their “enterprise” label.
  • Stop scaling SMB paid acquisition under current economics.
  • End unlimited phone support as the default for new low-priced plans, while honoring existing commitments and managing any migration carefully.
  • Stop broad roadmap work that cannot demonstrate a connection to mid-market acquisition, retention, expansion, or essential platform health.

We will continue supporting existing enterprise and SMB customers. Focus is not abandonment.

3. Coherent actions for next year

A. Build the multi-location growth loop

Product and Engineering: Give mid-market the clear majority of discretionary roadmap capacity, after reliability, security, and contractual obligations.

Sequence three connected capabilities:

  1. Multi-location reporting: Give central operators visibility into staffing and hours across their estate.
  2. Payroll integrations: Prioritize providers used by the largest share of our target accounts; reduce recurring payroll friction.
  3. Shift templates: Make successful scheduling practices reusable across locations.

In Q1, validate scope with retained, expanding customers and establish adoption and workflow baselines. Release reporting and the first prioritized integration in the first half; expand integrations and template-based rollout in the second half. Measure customer outcomes and subsequent location adoption, not merely shipment.

B. Sell and expand the same repeatable product

Sales and Customer Success: Redirect incremental commercial investment toward mid-market rather than enterprise hiring.

Package a standard multi-location deployment, define onboarding milestones, and build expansion reviews around customers’ remaining locations. Align incentives with retained recurring revenue and successful activation, not bookings alone.

Increase acquisition spending in stages only while segment payback remains within our guardrail. Do not assume today’s economics survive unlimited scaling.

C. Repair SMB service economics

Support, Product, and Finance: Identify the largest ticket drivers in Q1. Improve onboarding and in-product guidance around those problems; test appropriately priced phone support and service tiers for new customers.

Pilot changes before broad rollout. Evaluate support savings alongside conversion, retention, and revenue effects. A lower ticket count caused by driving customers away is not success.

D. Keep enterprise as a bounded learning option

Sales and Product: Accept new enterprise opportunities only when they fit the standard product, require no bespoke core-team development, and meet Finance-approved deal economics.

Review enterprise quarterly. Reconsider a larger investment only after multiple customers buy and deploy substantially the same product, with improving margin and acquisition payback. One marquee logo is not proof.

E. Establish a shared economic scorecard

Finance: In Q1, reconcile acquisition costs, implementation costs, support allocation, and payback definitions across segments. Confirm whether support is already included in gross margin before subtracting it again. Track custom engineering separately so its opportunity cost remains visible.

4. How we will know it is working

These are proposed operating targets, not forecasts:

MeasureBaselineYear-end target / guardrail
------:---:
Mid-market ARR$12.91MAt least $16.1M, approximately 25% growth
Mid-market NRR118%At least 120%
Mid-market annual logo churn7%No worse than 7%
Mid-market CAC payback9 monthsAt most 12 months while scaling
Mid-market gross margin81%At least 80%
SMB tickets per active accountEstablish in Q1Reduce 25%, without worsening cohort revenue retention
New bespoke enterprise core-team workFive of last eight dealsZero

The executive team will review results monthly and resource allocation quarterly. Leading indicators are faster location activation, adoption of the new workflows, and expansion pipeline; financial outcomes remain the test.

The strategy is not “avoid enterprise.” It is “scale the repeatable business we have earned.” Mid-market gives us the strongest foundation for growth next year—and a healthier route into enterprise later.

Grades and run details

Decision model 88 · LLM judge 85
Decision model checks
  • passUses the supplied evidence correctly19%
  • passAddresses the actual decision99%
  • passRespects explicit constraints47%
  • passIdentifies material uncertainty45%
  • partialAvoids unsupported claims43%
  • passProduces the required deliverable69%
  • passReads the segment economics66%
  • passTells the CEO plainly100%
  • passDiagnosis before prescription100%
  • partialProposes tests that could fail74%
  • partialNames an advantage that's hard to copy76%
  • passSays what it gives up100%
Run
Run
#1
Time to output
39 s
Submitted
5 Oct 2026

Usable with a quick edit10 of 12 checks passed

The output is a well-reasoned, complete strategy memo with correct evidence; a product manager could use it with light edits to wording or emphasis without re-checking facts or logic.

Output

Cadence: Next-Year Strategy

To: CEO and executive team From: VP Product Decision: Make multi-location mid-market customers our growth engine—not enterprise.

1. Diagnosis: Our constraint is profitable, repeatable growth

I think the enterprise-first plan is wrong for next year. Enterprise may become attractive, but our current evidence does not justify hiring ten enterprise AEs, adding a solutions team, and committing the core product team to enterprise features simultaneously. That would scale a motion we have not yet made repeatable.

Our strongest business is already mid-market:

SegmentCurrent ARR¹Gross marginCAC paybackNRRAnnual logo churn
------:---:---:---:---:
SMB self-serve$6.8M78%31 months88%34%
Mid-market$12.9M81%9 months118%7%
Enterprise$3.3M64%26 months104%9%

¹Customers multiplied by average ARR.

Mid-market contributes approximately 56% of current ARR, has the best retention and margins, and expands through additional locations and seats. Its 61% win rate against our main competitor suggests a competitive advantage worth reinforcing.

Enterprise has larger contracts, but not better economics. Sales take nine months; five of the last eight deals required custom features, consuming approximately 70 engineer-weeks. Those deals impose an opportunity cost beyond their acquisition expense: the core team cannot simultaneously build bespoke workflows and improve the product that drives our best-performing segment. Enterprise NRR of 104% provides little evidence that expansion will compensate for that burden.

SMB is also not an efficient growth engine today. Trial conversion is 4%, annual churn is 34%, and SMB generates 62% of support tickets. Unlimited phone support on a predominantly $79/month plan is a service promise poorly matched to customer value.

We should validate how support costs enter reported gross margin and payback before constructing a fully loaded profitability model. But the segment ranking is clear enough to act.

The central problem is resource allocation: we are tempted by large contracts while underinvesting in the customers where acquisition, retention, expansion, and product fit already reinforce one another.

2. Guiding policy: Win repeatable multi-location growth

Where we play: Businesses with hourly workers operating multiple locations, within our existing mid-market segment. We will refine that profile by industry, location count, and integration needs using our strongest retained and expanding cohorts—not assume every mid-market customer is equally attractive.

How we win: Make it easier to run scheduling, time tracking, and payroll handoffs consistently across locations. Land with a repeatable implementation, then grow as customers add locations and seats.

What we stop:

  • Do not execute the proposed enterprise hiring plan. No ten-AE expansion or dedicated solutions-team buildout next year.
  • Stop allowing individual prospects to commandeer the core roadmap. Custom workflows are not a strategic product category.
  • Stop optimizing SMB for signup volume while ignoring conversion, churn, and support burden.
  • Stop promising unlimited phone support to new low-price SMB customers. Change existing commitments carefully at renewal, with notice and clear alternatives.

We will retain and serve existing enterprise customers and accept selective new opportunities that fit the standard product. Enterprise remains an option to prove—not the company’s organizing strategy.

3. Coherent actions for next year

A. Build the multi-location operating backbone

Owners: Product and Engineering

Commit at least 70% of planned product capacity to the mid-market growth loop and its enabling reliability work.

Prioritize the three requests supported by current customer evidence:

  1. Multi-location reporting: Give operators a consistent view across sites.
  2. Payroll integrations: Reduce manual handoffs and implementation friction; prioritize providers used by our target customers.
  3. Shift templates: Make repeatable scheduling easier across locations.

In Q1, confirm priority and scope through customer research, usage data, and lost-deal analysis. Ship in staged releases during Q2–Q3, then use Q4 to improve adoption and remove rollout friction. Success means customers using these capabilities—not merely features released.

SSO and audit logs enter the roadmap only where they unlock repeatable demand from our target segment or address necessary security obligations. We will not bundle them with speculative custom workflows.

B. Align selling and customer success around location expansion

Owners: Sales and Customer Success

Reallocate growth investment toward mid-market rather than enterprise headcount. Increase selling capacity in stages, conditional on cohort payback remaining healthy.

Create a standard qualification and implementation playbook. Establish an explicit location-expansion plan for suitable customers, including rollout milestones, adoption checkpoints, and commercial packaging that makes expansion straightforward.

Track why we win against our main competitor and turn that evidence into positioning, demonstrations, and onboarding. Product adoption, selling, and expansion should reinforce the same promise.

C. Repair SMB economics without abandoning customers

Owners: Growth and Support

For new customers, introduce clear support tiers, reserving phone support for appropriately priced plans. Improve onboarding and self-service around the largest ticket drivers. Test packaging and onboarding changes before broad rollout.

Do not increase SMB acquisition spending until conversion and cohort payback improve. Existing customers receive a transparent transition, not a surprise withdrawal of service.

D. Put enterprise behind an investment gate

Owners: CEO, Sales, Finance, and Product

Require executive approval for exceptions, with engineering effort and opportunity cost recorded before signing. Prefer standard-product deals; do not hide custom development inside revenue targets.

Reconsider a dedicated enterprise expansion only when successive cohorts demonstrate materially improved margins, payback approaching 12–15 months, and wins that do not depend on bespoke core-team work. A handful of large bookings is insufficient evidence.

4. How we will know it is working

Finance will establish consistent cohort definitions and quarterly reporting in Q1. Our proposed operating targets are:

  • Mid-market: NRR at least 120%; annual logo churn no worse than 7%; gross margin at least 80%; CAC payback no worse than 12 months as we scale.
  • Competitive position: Maintain at least a 60% win rate against our main competitor, using a consistent opportunity definition.
  • Product impact: Improve time to activate additional locations and adoption of reporting, integrations, and templates against Q1 baselines.
  • SMB repair: Lower tickets per customer and support cost per customer, improve trial conversion, and shorten new-cohort payback without worsening retention.
  • Execution discipline: Deliver the agreed mid-market capacity allocation and report every enterprise customization exception.

These are targets, not a revenue forecast. Finance should translate the strategy into a funded operating plan.

Bottom line: Next year should prove that Cadence can compound a repeatable advantage. Mid-market already shows that pattern. Enterprise currently does not.

Grades and run details

Decision model 83 · LLM judge 85
Decision model checks
  • passUses the supplied evidence correctly26%
  • passAddresses the actual decision100%
  • passRespects explicit constraints49%
  • passIdentifies material uncertainty48%
  • partialAvoids unsupported claims43%
  • passProduces the required deliverable72%
  • partialReads the segment economics36%
  • passTells the CEO plainly100%
  • passDiagnosis before prescription100%
  • partialProposes tests that could fail78%
  • partialNames an advantage that's hard to copy70%
  • passSays what it gives up100%
Run
Run
#1
API response time
43 s
Submitted
6 Oct 2026

Check by check

Where the outputs differ comes first. Open a check to read the judge’s reasons. “Mixed” means the two graders disagreed.

All got wrong 2

Proposes tests that could failWrongWrong
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

The SMB pilot lacks a numeric threshold for success; while the payback guardrail has a threshold and action, not every proposed test/gate meets the full requirement.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

The operating targets for mid-market and SMB lack explicit actions if missed; only the enterprise gate specifies what each result triggers.

Names an advantage that's hard to copyWrongWrong
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

The strategy relies on features and a high win rate but does not name a specific barrier that would prevent a well-funded competitor from copying the multi-location advantage.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

Does not name a durable advantage or barrier that would prevent a well-funded competitor from copying the multi-location focus and features.

All got right 10

Uses the supplied evidence correctlyRightRight
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

All factual claims about the current situation are drawn directly from the supplied context or simple arithmetic.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

All facts and figures about the current situation are directly from the supplied context or correct arithmetic; nothing is invented.

Addresses the actual decisionRightRight
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

The memo commits early to mid-market over enterprise, says the enterprise-first plan is wrong, and states conditions to reconsider enterprise investment.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

Commits early to mid-market as the growth engine, says the enterprise plan is wrong, and states conditions for reconsidering enterprise.

Respects explicit constraintsRightRight
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

The output is a strategy memo under 1,200 words, includes diagnosis, guiding policy, actions, and metrics, and directly addresses the CEO.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

Memo is within 1,200 words, includes all requested sections, and addresses the CEO directly.

Identifies material uncertaintyRightRight
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

It notes the need to confirm support cost accounting, that vertical selection is not yet supported, and sets conditions for scaling acquisition and enterprise investment.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

Acknowledges uncertainty in support cost accounting and sets explicit, measurable conditions for revisiting enterprise.

Avoids unsupported claimsRightRight
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

Interpretations are presented as such (e.g., 'suggests a defensible product advantage'), and forecasts are clearly not stated as fact.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

Interpretations are clearly framed as diagnosis or opinion, not as established facts.

Produces the required deliverableRightRight
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

The memo is complete, well-structured for the executive team, within length, and actionable without major gaps.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

Complete strategy memo with diagnosis, policy, actions, and metrics, usable by the exec team as is.

Reads the segment economicsRightRight
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

It explicitly uses payback, retention, and support cost for all three segments and concludes mid-market is strongest, SMB economics are poor, and enterprise is slow/costly.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

Works through payback, retention, and support costs for all three segments, correctly concluding mid-market is strongest, SMB is inefficient, and enterprise is slow and costly.

Tells the CEO plainlyRightRight
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

It clearly states the enterprise-first plan is wrong for next year, backs it with numbers, and presents the alternative.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

Directly tells the CEO the enterprise-first plan is wrong, with supporting numbers and a clear alternative.

Diagnosis before prescriptionRightRight
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

The crux (allocating scarce capacity toward repeatable retained revenue) is grounded in the evidence, and actions directly address enterprise custom work and SMB support drain.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

Diagnosis names resource allocation as the crux, and all major actions reallocate resources toward mid-market and away from enterprise and SMB inefficiencies.

Says what it gives upRightRight
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT

It explicitly lists what it stops: enterprise AE hiring, custom enterprise work, SMB paid acquisition scaling, unlimited phone support, and broad roadmap work, with reasons.

GPT-6.1 Sol · API

Explicitly lists stops: enterprise hiring, custom work, SMB signup optimization, and unlimited phone support for low-price plans.

Results

Every setup we’ve tested on this task type, across all its tasks and repeats, graded on the current checklist. Calibrated. Where our PM checked the graders by hand, they agreed on 84% of 76 checks.

#Model · HarnessTask scoreDecision modelLLM judgeRunsCritical failures
1GPT-6 AstrawithChatGPT83.388.52None
2Haiku 5.5withAPI77.180.82None
3Sonnet 5.5withAPI77.180.82None
4GPT-6.1 SolwithAPI79.276.92None
5GPT-6 LunawithAPI77.176.92None
6Opus 5.5withClaude83.365.42None
7Gemini 3.8 FlashwithAPI68.857.72None
8Gemini 3.5 Flash-LitewithGemini60.442.32None

What you get for the cost

No setup scores within 5 points of the leader at half its cost or less here, so the leader is also the best value.

Task score against relative cost for each setup. The table below has the same figures.4050607080901001×3×10×30×100×Cost per output, relative to the cheapest setup (log scale) →↑ Task scoreGPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT: task score 87, 84× the cheapest (1 of 2 outputs estimated)Haiku 5.5 · API: task score 80, 1.7× the cheapestSonnet 5.5 · API: task score 78, 27× the cheapestGPT-6.1 Sol · API: task score 77, 12× the cheapestGPT-6 Luna · API: task score 74, the cheapestOpus 5.5 · Claude: task score 71, 68× the cheapest (1 of 2 outputs estimated)Gemini 3.8 Flash · API: task score 61, 8.1× the cheapestGemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini: task score 49, 3.1× the cheapest (1 of 2 outputs estimated)GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPTHaiku 5.5 · APISonnet 5.5 · APIGPT-6.1 Sol · APIGPT-6 Luna · APIOpus 5.5 · ClaudeGemini 3.8 Flash · APIGemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini
Nobody beats these on both score and costCost partly estimated (app runs with no usage meter)
Task score and relative cost by setup
SetupTask scoreRelative cost (cheapest = 1)
GPT-6 Luna · API741.0×
Haiku 5.5 · API801.7×
Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini493.1× (partly estimated)
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API618.1×
GPT-6.1 Sol · API7712×
Sonnet 5.5 · API7827×
Opus 5.5 · Claude7168× (partly estimated)
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT8784× (partly estimated)

Cost is each output’s tokens at the model’s list price, shown relative to the cheapest setup. Runs done in an app have no usage meter, so theirs are estimated from the same setup’s measured runs. How we compare cost

About the task

The PM job

Writing a strategy memo that leadership can act on.

Why it matters

Strategy that doesn't choose isn't strategy. Models write fluent strategic prose easily; making a choice the evidence supports and naming what it gives up is harder.

What good looks like

  • Diagnoses the one obstacle that matters before prescribing
  • Makes one clear choice and names what is sacrificed
  • Grounds the choice in the supplied evidence
  • Surfaces the tension or contradiction in the data
  • Defines how we would know it is working

Deliberately not measured

  • Market sizing accuracy beyond the supplied data
  • Financial modelling
Capability tested

Choosing where to play and what not to do, from supplied evidence

The failure we’re looking for

Strategic-sounding aspirations without a diagnosis or a choice

Grading

Decision model and LLM judge, calibrated against a blind PM review