Tasks / Strategy

Develop product strategy

Can the model make a coherent choice grounded in the evidence, rather than list aspirations?

Task type v1.1 · 2 tasksLast changed 6 Oct 2026 · ChangelogDifficulty

What AI gets right here, and what you’ll still have to catch

From 16 graded outputs by 8 models. 38% were usable with at most a quick edit.

Reliably right

  1. Produces the required deliverable100% pass
    Complete strategy document in the requested form, length, and for the named reader; the board could act on it.
    GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT · Supply or demand for a stalled marketplace
  2. Diagnosis before prescription100% pass
    Diagnosis: students can't find the right tutor; actions (intake, recommendations, rematch, manual matching) directly address it.
    GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT · Supply or demand for a stalled marketplace
  3. Tells the CEO plainly100% pass
    It clearly states the enterprise-first plan is wrong for next year, backs it with numbers, and presents the alternative.
    GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT · Enterprise, says the CEO

Where it slips

  1. Names an advantage that's hard to copy11% pass
    Does not name a benefit and a barrier that a well-funded competitor couldn't copy; no moat is identified.
    GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT · Supply or demand for a stalled marketplace
  2. Proposes tests that could fail42% pass
    The SMB pilot lacks a numeric threshold for success; while the payback guardrail has a threshold and action, not every proposed test/gate meets the full requirement.
    GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT · Enterprise, says the CEO
  3. Avoids unsupported claims44% pass
    Presents 'root cause: we've let the loudest requests set the roadmap' and 'SMB remains our top-of-funnel' as facts without labelling them as hypotheses or citing evidence.
    Haiku 5.5 · API · Enterprise, says the CEO

How it’s graded

Each check is built on how world-class product and growth leaders do this work, as they’ve described it on Lenny’s Podcast, and names the leader it comes from.

  1. Diagnosis before prescription

    Does the strategy name the crux, the specific obstacle or opportunity the evidence points to, and do the proposed actions follow from that diagnosis?

    Passes when States one crux grounded in the supplied evidence, and each major action visibly addresses it.

  2. Names an advantage that's hard to copy

    Does the strategy say what will make its position hard for an informed, well-funded competitor to copy (a benefit customers value plus a barrier to copying it), rather than relying on being first, on features, or on funding?

    Passes when Names the benefit and the barrier, and why a capable competitor couldn't simply replicate it.

  3. Says what it gives up

    Does the strategy name what the company will stop doing, or deliberately not do, in order to pursue it?

    Passes when Names at least one real thing being dropped or declined, with the reason it loses out.

Plus our standard checks

Uses the supplied evidence correctly · Addresses the actual decision · Respects explicit constraints · Identifies material uncertainty · Avoids unsupported claims · Produces the required deliverable · Proposes tests that could fail · and 2 written for each task, which you’ll see in the tasks below.

The tasks

Read the brief, then compare up to three outputs, each with the LLM judge’s verdict on every check. Highlights mark what a PM had to fix.

The brief

You're the VP Product at Cadence. Our CEO wants a strategy for next year the exec team can rally behind, and believes it's enterprise (the note is below). Write the strategy memo, in no more than 1,200 words: the diagnosis, the guiding policy (where we play and what we stop), the coherent actions for next year, and how we'll know it's working. Tell the CEO if you think they're wrong. The files are attached.

What the model was given6 items: About Cadence, ceo_note.md, unit_economics_by_segment.csv, enterprise_detail.md, mid_market_detail.md, smb_detail.md
About CadenceStaff scheduling and time tracking, sold to businesses with hourly workers.
ceo_note.md1 lines · Download
From the CEO: "I want a strategy for next year that the exec team can rally behind. I believe it's enterprise. Tell me if I'm wrong."
unit_economics_by_segment.csv3 rows · Download
segment,customers,avg_arr_usd,gross_margin_pct,support_cost_per_customer_year_usd,cac_usd,payback_months,net_revenue_retention_pct,logo_churn_year_pct
SMB self-serve,6200,1100,78,610,740,31,88,34
Mid-market,890,14500,81,1900,9800,9,118,7
Enterprise,34,96000,64,21000,118000,26,104,9
enterprise_detail.md4 lines · Download
# Enterprise detail

- Average sales cycle: 9 months. 5 of the last 8 deals needed custom features (built by the core team, about 14 engineer-weeks each).
- The CEO's plan: "Win enterprise. Hire 10 enterprise AEs and a solutions team, and build SSO, audit logs and custom workflows this year."
mid_market_detail.md5 lines · Download
# Mid-market detail

- Best-retaining segment. Expansion comes from adding locations and seats.
- Top requests: multi-location reporting, payroll integrations, shift templates.
- Win rate against our main competitor: 61%.
smb_detail.md4 lines · Download
# SMB self-serve detail

- 62% of support tickets come from SMB accounts. Free trial converts at 4%.
- Most SMB customers are on the $79/month plan with unlimited phone support.
What a strong answer doesThe answer key the graders mark against

Diagnoses from the unit economics: mid-market is the engine (payback 9 months, NRR 118%, churn 7%, wins 61% against the main competitor); SMB self-serve loses money once support and churn are counted (about $1,100 a year at 78% gross margin is about $860, minus $610 of support, leaves about $250 a year against $740 to acquire, with 34% leaving each year; payback 31 months, NRR 88%) and generates 62% of tickets; enterprise is slow and expensive (payback 26 months, 64% gross margin, 9-month cycles, 5 of 8 deals needing about 14 engineer-weeks of custom work). Tells the CEO the enterprise bet is wrong for next year: it would pull the core team into custom work and stretch payback. Policy: win mid-market, expanding on locations and seats; stop subsidising SMB support (change the plan or pricing, self-serve support, raise the entry price) rather than abandon it; serve enterprise only where it buys the product as is. Coherent actions: mid-market roadmap (multi-location reporting, payroll integrations, shift templates), SMB support and pricing changes, no custom enterprise work. Names what it gives up and how it'll know (mid-market NRR and payback, SMB support cost per customer).

Critical failures (cap the score at 40)
  • Recommends hiring the enterprise team and building custom workflows as next year's main strategy
Task

Staff-level · v1.0

The outputs

8 setups answered this brief.

Needs more than a quick edit8 of 12 checks passed

The memo fails to identify material uncertainties, lacks actionable test-fail triggers, and does not define a defensible moat, so a product manager would need to rework those strategic elements.

Output

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief Executive Officer FROM: VP of Product DATE: October 24, 2023 SUBJECT: Next Year Strategy: Diagnosis, Guiding Policy, and Execution Roadmap

---

Executive Summary: The Direct Answer

You asked: “I believe it’s enterprise. Tell me if I’m wrong.”

You are wrong. Going all-in on Enterprise next year would be an expensive strategic error.

Enterprise is currently acting as a high-friction, low-margin professional services trap. It requires 9-month sales cycles, consumes massive engineering resources (70 engineer-weeks burned on bespoke code for just five recent deals), and yields an uninspiring 104% NRR at a 26-month CAC payback. Hiring 10 enterprise AEs and a solutions team right now will accelerate cash burn while starving our real growth engine.

That growth engine is Mid-Market. Mid-market is exceptional: 81% gross margin, 9-month CAC payback, 118% NRR, 7% logo churn, and a 61% win rate against our primary competitor.

Next year, our rallying cry must be: Dominate Mid-Market, automate SMB into positive cash flow, and gate Enterprise until our core platform is ready.

---

1. Diagnosis: Where Value Is Created and Destroyed

Our current ARR is ~$23M across three starkly different businesses:

MetricSMB Self-ServeMid-MarketEnterprise
:---:---:---:---
Active Customers6,20089034
Total ARR (approx.)$6.82M (30%)$12.91M (56%)$3.26M (14%)
Avg. ARR / Customer$1,100$14,500$96,000
Gross Margin78%81%64%
Support Cost / Customer / Yr$610 (55% of ARR)$1,900 (13% of ARR)$21,000 (22% of ARR)
CAC Payback31 months9 months26 months
NRR / Logo Churn88% / 34%118% / 7%104% / 9%
Competitive Win RateN/A61%Elongated (9 mo)

#### Three Key Findings:

  1. Mid-Market is an elite SaaS business. Customers expand by adding locations and headcount (118% NRR). Our sales efficiency is world-class (9-month payback vs. industry average of 14–18 months). Most importantly, their feature requests (multi-location reporting, payroll integrations, shift templates) are repeatable, software-native, and scale across the entire cohort.
  2. Enterprise is a bespoke distraction masquerading as scale. At 64% gross margin, 26-month payback, and only 104% NRR, our Enterprise motion does not scale. 5 of our last 8 deals required custom development—averaging 14 engineer-weeks per deal. We are acting as a subsidized software development shop for 34 accounts, pulling our best product talent away from core roadmap investments.
  3. SMB is drowning our operations. SMB accounts for 62% of all support tickets. We charge $79/month ($948/yr) while spending $610/year in support per customer due to unlimited phone support. With 34% logo churn and 88% NRR, the 31-month CAC payback means a significant portion of SMB customers churn before breaking even on acquisition and service costs.

---

2. Guiding Policy: Where We Play, Where We Win, and What We Stop

Our guiding policy for next year is Repeatable Scale over Bespoke Revenue.

``` ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ MID-MARKET: ACCELERATE │ │ Core growth vector; 118% NRR; 9-mo payback │ └──────────────────────┬───────────────────────┘ │ ┌─────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────┐ ▼ ▼ ┌─────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────────┐ │ SMB: AUTOMATE │ │ ENTERPRISE: DISCIPLINE │ │ Eliminate phone support │ │ Freeze custom dev; sell off-the- │ │ Product-led self-service │ │ shelf MM product at premium tier │ └─────────────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────────────────┘ ```

#### Where We Play: * The Sweet Spot: Multi-unit hourly employers with 50–500 employees (Mid-Market). These buyers have acute scheduling complexity across locations but lack the bureaucratic demands for custom software architectures.

#### What We Stop: * Stop custom engineering for individual deals. Zero custom branching or deal-contingent roadmap commits. * Stop hiring 10 Enterprise AEs. We will not deploy massive quota capacity into a 9-month sales cycle with an unstandardized product. * Stop offering phone support on sub-$5,000 ARR plans. Unlimited phone support for $79/month ends in Q1.

---

3. Coherent Actions for Next Year

To execute this guiding policy, our actions across Product, GTM, and Operations must reinforce each other.

#### A. Product & Engineering: The Repeatable Core * Deliver the Mid-Market Trifecta (H1): Allocate 70% of product capacity to build: 1. Multi-location reporting & dashboarding (enables regional managers to view compliance and labor costs across units). 2. Tier-1 payroll integrations (ADP, Gusto, Paychex, UKG) to make scheduling-to-payroll frictionless. 3. Advanced shift templates & auto-scheduling to drive rapid store-level adoption. * Enterprise Baseline, not Bespoke (H2): Build only standardized administrative features (SAML SSO, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, role-based access control). If an enterprise buyer cannot deploy our standard multi-tenant product with these enterprise rails, we walk away. * SMB Self-Serve & Deflection: Revamp onboarding flows to drive the 4% trial conversion rate upward and deploy in-app guided setup, chat deflection, and an updated knowledge center to cut incoming tickets.

#### B. Go-To-Market: Scaling the Engine * Reallocate Capital from Enterprise to Mid-Market: Instead of 10 Enterprise AEs, hire 6 Mid-Market AEs and 2 MM Sales Engineers. With our 9-month payback and 61% win rate, MM sales hires will reach cash-flow break-even within the year. * Establish an Enterprise Gatekeeper Rule: The existing enterprise sales team may close deals only under two conditions: (1) standard product only (contractually zero custom dev), and (2) minimum contract value of $100k ARR with standard pricing. * Refocus Inbound & Outbound: Concentrate marketing spend on multi-unit franchisees, regional hospitality groups, and mid-sized healthcare operators.

#### C. Operations & Support: Unit Economic Realignment * Tiered Support Model (Effective Q1): * SMB / Self-serve: In-app digital assistant, community, and email support (target: reduce support cost from $610 to <$150/year). * Mid-Market: Priority email, live chat, and scheduled onboarding calls. * Enterprise: Dedicated CSM and SLA-backed escalation. * Grandfathering/Pricing Migration for SMB: Shift low-tier customers requiring phone support to an “Assisted Support” add-on ($99/month), turning a cost center into a margin-accretive tier.

---

4. Scorecard: How We’ll Know It’s Working

We will monitor operational health and strategic traction via four quarterly benchmarks:

PillarMetricBaselineEnd of Next Year Target
:---:---:---:---
Mid-Market GrowthNet New ARR Added~$4.5M/yr run rate$8.0M+
Expansion HealthMid-Market NRR118%125%+
SMB Unit EconomicsSMB Blended Support Cost / Year$610<$200
SMB PaybackSMB CAC Payback Months31 months<14 months
Product DisciplineEngineer-weeks spent on custom deal features~70 weeks (last 8 deals)0 weeks
Company EfficiencyBlended Gross Margin76%82%+

---

Conclusion

Enterprise is seductive because the contract sizes are large. But right now, chasing it will turn us into a bespoke agency with depressed margins and burnt-out engineers.

Mid-Market is our path to category leadership. It gives us high win rates, compounding expansion, rapid payback, and product leverage. Once we harden the platform with multi-location mid-market capabilities and standardized enterprise controls, we can attack the enterprise from a position of structural strength—not structural compromise.

Grades and run details

Decision model 71 · LLM judge 69
Decision model checks
  • failUses the supplied evidence correctly15%
  • passAddresses the actual decision64%
  • passRespects explicit constraints28%
  • failIdentifies material uncertainty80%
  • partialAvoids unsupported claims41%
  • passProduces the required deliverable83%
  • passReads the segment economics96%
  • passTells the CEO plainly100%
  • passDiagnosis before prescription100%
  • partialProposes tests that could fail54%
  • partialNames an advantage that's hard to copy27%
  • passSays what it gives up100%
Run
Run
#1
API response time
30 s
Submitted
6 Oct 2026

Needs more than a quick edit6 of 12 checks passed

The memo contains factual inaccuracies (incorrect SMB average price and net-negative margin claim) that a PM would need to correct before use; otherwise the reasoning is sound but the errors undermine trust in the evidence.

Output

MEMORANDUM

TO: CEO FROM: VP of Product DATE: October 24, 2023 SUBJECT: Product & Go-To-Market Strategy for Next Year

*

You asked for a strategy the executive team can rally behind, and stated your belief that our future lies in enterprise.

You are wrong. If we pivot our resources toward enterprise next year, we will stall our fastest-growing segment, burn cash on an unscalable product architecture, and distract the company from our true economic engine.

Here is our reality, our diagnosis, and the strategy we should actually pursue.

---

1. The Diagnosis: Where the Numbers Really Point

To evaluate your enterprise hypothesis, we have to look at the unit economics across our three segments (SMB, Mid-Market, Enterprise):

  • SMB Self-Serve (6,200 customers, $1,100 ARR): This segment is an anchor dragging us down. A 34% logo churn and 88% NRR means we are running to stay in place. Worse, 62% of our support tickets come from SMB accounts who pay an average of $79/month while demanding unlimited phone support. We are subsidizing their operations at a severe net-negative margin once support costs are factored in.
  • Enterprise (34 customers, $96,000 ARR): Enterprise looks glossy on the top line, but the mechanics are broken. Our payback period is 26 months, our gross margin has cratered to 64% (due to heavy support and custom engineering), and NRR is a mediocre 104%. As noted in the enterprise detail, 5 of our last 8 deals required custom features built by our core engineering team—averaging 14 engineer-weeks each. We are currently operating as a custom software consultancy for large accounts, not a scalable SaaS business.
  • Mid-Market (890 customers, $14,500 ARR): This is our crown jewel. Mid-market boasts an 81% gross margin, a lightning-fast 9-month payback period, a stellar 118% NRR, and a low 7% logo churn. We win 61% of deals against our main competitor here. Expansion happens organically as clients add locations and seats.

The Diagnosis: We are suffering from strategic schizophrenia. We are spending engineering cycles building bespoke features for 34 enterprise logos while burning support bandwidth on 6,200 low-end SMBs. Meanwhile, we are under-investing in the Mid-Market—the only segment where we have product-market fit, high retention, and clear competitive dominance.

---

2. The Guiding Policy

Where We Play: We will focus our go-to-market, product development, and company roadmap entirely on the Mid-Market (companies with roughly 100 to 1,000 hourly workers).

What We Stop: 1. We stop custom enterprise builds. We will not pull core engineers off the roadmap to build one-off workflows for enterprise deals. If a whale customer requires custom engineering, we walk away. 2. We stop optimizing for SMB acquisition. We will sunset active acquisition efforts for self-serve SMBs and strip away unscalable touchpoints (like unlimited phone support for $79/mo accounts) to stop the margin bleed. 3. We stop treating Enterprise as our primary growth vector. We will not hire 10 enterprise AEs or build a dedicated solutions team.

By pulling back from Enterprise and SMB, we concentrate all our capital on scaling what is already working brilliantly in the Mid-Market.

---

3. Coherent Actions for Next Year

To capture the mid-market opportunity, product and go-to-market will execute three synchronized moves:

#### Action 1: Productize for Mid-Market Expansion (Product & Engineering) Instead of building custom enterprise workflows (SSO, audit logs, and bespoke routing), our engineering team will build the top three requested features that drive multi-location expansion and stickiness in the Mid-Market: * Multi-location reporting: Giving regional managers roll-up visibility across disparate sites. * Robust payroll integrations: Deepening native syncs with major mid-market payroll providers to reduce administrative friction. * Advanced shift templates: Allowing complex scheduling rules to be deployed instantly across new locations.

#### Action 2: Pivot Go-To-Market to Land-and-Expand (Sales & Marketing) We will reallocate budget from SMB acquisition and enterprise pipe-dreams directly into Mid-Market account executive and customer success headcount. * Our motion will focus on landing a mid-market business at a single location or division, then leveraging our stellar NRR (118%) to expand horizontally into new locations. * We will introduce tiered packaging that naturally captures revenue as mid-market clients add locations and seats.

#### Action 3: Streamline or Harvest the SMB Tier (Operations & Support) We cannot drop our existing 6,200 SMB customers overnight, but we must stop bleeding margin on them. * Transition self-serve SMB support away from expensive phone queues to a self-service knowledge base and AI-driven chat. * Raise prices on legacy low-tier plans to match the true cost-to-serve, accepting natural churn as a feature, not a bug, which frees up support capacity for our mid-market clients.

---

4. How We'll Know It's Working

If we execute this focus on the Mid-Market, we will see specific operational shifts within the next 12 months:

  1. Mid-Market ARR Growth: Mid-market ARR growth rate accelerates by 35% year-over-year as we direct 80% of our sales and marketing capacity here.
  2. Payback and Margins: Our blended gross margin climbs back toward 80%+ as high-margin mid-market revenue outpaces low-margin enterprise custom work and unprofitable SMB volume. Payback periods across the active customer base remain under 10 months.
  3. NRR Expansion: Mid-market NRR increases from 118% to 122%+ driven by faster multi-location adoption of our new reporting and payroll features.
  4. Engineering Velocity: Feature delivery velocity increases by 40% because engineering is no longer interrupted by 14-week custom enterprise implementations.

Summary

Pivoting to enterprise feels ambitious, but the data tells us it is a trap. We would be trading a high-margin, highly defensible leadership position in the Mid-Market to become a low-margin, high-friction consultancy for a handful of giants.

Let’s double down on where we win, where retention is highest, and where our unit economics sing. Let's own the Mid-Market next year.

Grades and run details

Decision model 71 · LLM judge 46
Decision model checks
  • partialUses the supplied evidence correctly3%
  • passAddresses the actual decision45%
  • passRespects explicit constraints54%
  • failIdentifies material uncertainty99%
  • failAvoids unsupported claims42%
  • passProduces the required deliverable76%
  • passReads the segment economics71%
  • passTells the CEO plainly100%
  • passDiagnosis before prescription100%
  • partialProposes tests that could fail49%
  • partialNames an advantage that's hard to copy59%
  • passSays what it gives up100%
Run
Run
#1
Time to output
9 s
Submitted
5 Oct 2026

Check by check

Where the outputs differ comes first. Open a check to read the judge’s reasons. “Mixed” means the two graders disagreed.

Where they differ 3

Uses the supplied evidence correctlyMixedWrong
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

All factual claims about the current situation are taken directly from the supplied context or derived by simple arithmetic from it.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

Claims about SMB average price ($79/mo) and net-negative margin are not supported by the supplied evidence; the average ARR is $91.67/mo and gross profit after support is positive.

Addresses the actual decisionRightMixed
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

The memo commits early and unambiguously to 'You are wrong' and a mid-market-led strategy, framed for the CEO, and implies the condition for revisiting enterprise is when the platform is hardened.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

The output does not state what result or condition would change the recommended decision.

Avoids unsupported claimsRightWrong
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

Interpretations like 'professional services trap' are directly supported by the custom-work and margin data, and the memo does not present unsupported causes or forecasts as fact.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

Interpretations such as 'severe net-negative margin' and 'we are under-investing' are presented as fact without hedging, and the net-negative claim is factually incorrect.

All got wrong 3

Identifies material uncertaintyWrongWrong
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

The memo does not name specific unknowns that could change the decision, nor does it say how they would be resolved or what result would change the call.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

No material unknowns that could change the decision are identified or discussed.

Proposes tests that could failWrongWrong
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

The scorecard provides numeric targets and a measurement window but does not specify what action each outcome would trigger, so the tests lack a clear fail condition with a linked decision.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

Success metrics are given with thresholds but no triggers or specified actions if they are not met.

Names an advantage that's hard to copyWrongWrong
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

The strategy does not name a benefit customers value plus a barrier that would prevent a well-funded competitor from copying it; it relies on features and execution speed.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

No distinct barrier to competition or moat is described; the strategy relies on features and market focus.

All got right 6

Respects explicit constraintsRightRight
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

The output is a strategy memo under 1,200 words, includes diagnosis, guiding policy, coherent actions, and success metrics, and tells the CEO they are wrong.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

The memo respects the requested form (strategy memo with sections), addresses the CEO, and is within 1,200 words.

Produces the required deliverableRightRight
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

The memo is complete, in the right form for the CEO, within the word limit, and contains actionable sections a CEO could use.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

The memo is complete, structured, and actionable for the CEO with at most light edits.

Reads the segment economicsRightRight
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

The memo works through payback, retention, and support cost for all three segments and correctly identifies mid-market as strongest, SMB as money-losing after support, and enterprise as slow and costly.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

The memo uses numbers from all three segments, including SMB support burden, to conclude mid-market is strongest and enterprise is costly.

Tells the CEO plainlyRightRight
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

The memo states 'You are wrong' directly, supports it with segment economics, and offers a clear alternative.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

Directly tells the CEO the enterprise plan is wrong, supported by numbers, and offers an alternative.

Diagnosis before prescriptionRightRight
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

The diagnosis identifies the crux (mid-market is the engine, enterprise is a distraction, SMB is a cost drain) and each major action visibly addresses it.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

Diagnosis of strategic schizophrenia is stated, and actions (productize for mid-market, pivot GTM, streamline SMB) address it.

Says what it gives upRightRight
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API

The memo explicitly lists what it stops: custom engineering for deals, hiring 10 enterprise AEs, and phone support on sub-$5,000 ARR plans, with reasons.

Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini

Explicitly stops custom enterprise builds, SMB acquisition optimization, and enterprise as primary growth vector.

Results

Every setup we’ve tested on this task type, across all its tasks and repeats, graded on the current checklist. Calibrated. Where our PM checked the graders by hand, they agreed on 84% of 76 checks.

#Model · HarnessTask scoreDecision modelLLM judgeRunsCritical failures
1GPT-6 AstrawithChatGPT83.388.52None
2Haiku 5.5withAPI77.180.82None
3Sonnet 5.5withAPI77.180.82None
4GPT-6.1 SolwithAPI79.276.92None
5GPT-6 LunawithAPI77.176.92None
6Opus 5.5withClaude83.365.42None
7Gemini 3.8 FlashwithAPI68.857.72None
8Gemini 3.5 Flash-LitewithGemini60.442.32None

What you get for the cost

No setup scores within 5 points of the leader at half its cost or less here, so the leader is also the best value.

Task score against relative cost for each setup. The table below has the same figures.4050607080901001×3×10×30×100×Cost per output, relative to the cheapest setup (log scale) →↑ Task scoreGPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT: task score 87, 84× the cheapest (1 of 2 outputs estimated)Haiku 5.5 · API: task score 80, 1.7× the cheapestSonnet 5.5 · API: task score 78, 27× the cheapestGPT-6.1 Sol · API: task score 77, 12× the cheapestGPT-6 Luna · API: task score 74, the cheapestOpus 5.5 · Claude: task score 71, 68× the cheapest (1 of 2 outputs estimated)Gemini 3.8 Flash · API: task score 61, 8.1× the cheapestGemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini: task score 49, 3.1× the cheapest (1 of 2 outputs estimated)GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPTHaiku 5.5 · APISonnet 5.5 · APIGPT-6.1 Sol · APIGPT-6 Luna · APIOpus 5.5 · ClaudeGemini 3.8 Flash · APIGemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini
Nobody beats these on both score and costCost partly estimated (app runs with no usage meter)
Task score and relative cost by setup
SetupTask scoreRelative cost (cheapest = 1)
GPT-6 Luna · API741.0×
Haiku 5.5 · API801.7×
Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite · Gemini493.1× (partly estimated)
Gemini 3.8 Flash · API618.1×
GPT-6.1 Sol · API7712×
Sonnet 5.5 · API7827×
Opus 5.5 · Claude7168× (partly estimated)
GPT-6 Astra · ChatGPT8784× (partly estimated)

Cost is each output’s tokens at the model’s list price, shown relative to the cheapest setup. Runs done in an app have no usage meter, so theirs are estimated from the same setup’s measured runs. How we compare cost

About the task

The PM job

Writing a strategy memo that leadership can act on.

Why it matters

Strategy that doesn't choose isn't strategy. Models write fluent strategic prose easily; making a choice the evidence supports and naming what it gives up is harder.

What good looks like

  • Diagnoses the one obstacle that matters before prescribing
  • Makes one clear choice and names what is sacrificed
  • Grounds the choice in the supplied evidence
  • Surfaces the tension or contradiction in the data
  • Defines how we would know it is working

Deliberately not measured

  • Market sizing accuracy beyond the supplied data
  • Financial modelling
Capability tested

Choosing where to play and what not to do, from supplied evidence

The failure we’re looking for

Strategic-sounding aspirations without a diagnosis or a choice

Grading

Decision model and LLM judge, calibrated against a blind PM review