Build a roadmap

Harbor Roadmap, Q4 2026 to Q3 2027

Pre-read for the planning offsite. Prepared from Tom's draft.

Part 1: The roadmap

Planning assumptions - Each existing squad has 11 squad-weeks of roadmap capacity a quarter. Work done in another squad's area costs 1.5×. - The two new squads are planned at the dates our history supports, not the approved dates. Last year's squads took 5 to 8 months from approval to their first full sprint. - Squad A: 0 weeks in Q1, about 5 in Q2 (half capacity), about 11 in Q3. - Squad B: 0 weeks in Q2, about 5 in Q3. - Nothing committed depends on either new squad. - The fiscal year runs Q4 2026 (Oct to Dec) through Q3 2027 (Jul to Sep).

Squad plan by quarter (squad-weeks in brackets)

Items, outcomes and key dates

NRR bridge: what this plan plausibly delivers by end of Q3 2027

Moving NRR from 104% to 112% needs about $6.9M of additional net expansion (8 points of $86M).

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Part 2: The case for it

The short version

Tom's draft has the right ingredients. It does, however, have three problems:

1. No buffer on the processor deadline. The migration has no room to slip against a date that could stop every card authorisation.
2. Key work sits on squads we won't have. Procurement and the mobile rewrite depend on new squads that history says won't exist at full capacity until Q3 at the earliest.
3. Procurement can't carry the goal. It is expected to deliver the NRR target, but the evidence doesn't support $6M and the timing puts almost none of it inside the measurement window.

This plan protects the deadline first. It then sequences the levers with the strongest evidence so they land early enough to count. Even so, product alone likely gets us to 107% to 110%, not 112%. The exec team should know that now, not in Q3.

Why this order

1. The processor migration comes first, with buffer.

Every authorisation runs through v1, so a missed cutover puts most of our revenue at risk. On Tom's draft: - Cards alone finishes the 18 weeks around late February. - The 4-week certification then ends in the last days of March. - That leaves under a week of slack, with December holidays not counted and no room for a failed certification.

Lending 5 Platform weeks in Q4 changes this: - Code complete moves to about 31 January. - Cutover lands around 1 March. - We have roughly four weeks of buffer.

This also means virtual cards can't "start in Q1" as the draft says. During certification nothing on our card stack can change. Cards will do design and sandbox work in Q1 and start production work after cutover.

2. Multi-entity and virtual cards next, because they have the best evidence and they land in time.

NRR is measured at the end of Q3, so anything launching after about June barely counts. Our two strongest levers are: - Multi-entity: 9 customers have committed in writing to add subsidiaries, which is about $1.5M to $2.9M. - Virtual cards: a $4.5M ceiling. 26 of our 60 largest customers asked for them.

Multi-entity ships in February. Virtual cards ship in May. Real-time spend controls follow in July because they share the Cards squad. They matter to 31 CFOs, but we haven't sized them.

3. Retention work runs in parallel, because it is cheap.

• Intacct: 9 weeks of work. It addresses a segment churning at nearly twice our NetSuite rate and appears in 31% of lost deals. The integration only reduces churn if customers actually move off CSV, so I added a Q1 migration push with CS.
• SSO and SCIM: 5 weeks of work. It protects 11 accounts and unblocks $1.2M of pipeline.

4. Procurement is real but gated, and it is not the FY27 lever.

What I changed from Tom's draft, and why

1. Migration buffer. Platform lends 5 weeks in Q4. The cost is that multi-entity moves from December to February. I think that trade is clearly right, because the downside of a missed cutover is existential.

2. New squads planned realistically. - Squads approved in September reach their first full sprint between February and May, based on last year's 5 to 8 months. - Each then runs at half capacity for a quarter. - Squad A realistically gives about 5 weeks in Q2. Squad B gives nothing before Q3. - I've kept every committed item on the existing five squads. The new squads are upside.

3. Procurement moved to Approvals & Policy and gated. - A&P owns the domain, has capacity after multi-entity, and was left without work in the draft. - Build starts in Q1. At the end of March we need signed paid-pilot commitments from about 10 customers beyond the two design partners, or we redirect A&P. - GA lands around September. If Squad A arrives on time, it accelerates the work.

4. The $6M procurement figure needs resetting with the board. - At $8 per user per month and 10% of our ~770,000 employees raising requests, the ceiling is about $7.4M a year if every customer adopts. $6M therefore implies about 81% adoption. - Only 2 of 6 design partners said they'd pay. The other four already use a dedicated tool. - At a one-in-three adoption rate, procurement is worth about $2.5M at full run-rate, reached over years, and less than $0.3M inside FY27. - I recommend Tom and the CFO correct this at the next board touchpoint, before the board starts tracking it.

5. Mobile rewrite moved to Expenses, starting in Q4. - Expenses owns the app and the draft left it idle after Q4. - The rewrite finishes by May, and the old app is retired by September. - This gives the CTO's deadline real margin. Leaving it on Squad B would risk missing it.

1. Spend controls now include the A&P work (4 weeks). The draft omitted this.

1. Dynamics moves from Q1 to May. The Intacct customer migration goes first, because Intacct matters roughly five times more by customer count and lost deals.

What we're not doing

• Not claiming procurement drives FY27 NRR. We are also not building past the March gate without paid commitments.
• Not starting virtual cards or anything else on the card stack before cutover.
• Not putting any deadline-critical or NRR-critical work on unhired squads.
• Not adding new-logo-only features beyond Intacct, Dynamics and SSO, which also serve retention. New logos come second this year, as the board set.
• Not filling the Q3 reserve on Platform and Integrations. That slack absorbs migration fallout, integration hardening and new-squad onboarding. If the migration goes cleanly, we can release it to card-spend adoption work at Q2 planning.

Risks that could change the plan

1. Certification fails or needs a second round. A re-run would consume the entire buffer. - Book the certification slot now. - Run a pre-certification dry run in January. - Ask the processor in writing for a contingency extension and an emergency-fix protocol for the freeze window. - If code complete slips past mid-February, pull more Platform capacity immediately.

2. The $410M software-spend figure is extrapolated from our 60 largest accounts. Smaller customers may put proportionally less software spend on cards. - In Q4, validate it with AP data from about 20 mid-sized customers. - If it halves, virtual cards is worth about $0.4M to $0.8M in window and spend controls rises in priority.

1. Multi-entity conversion comes in below the written commitments. CS should agree subsidiary onboarding plans with the 9 customers in Q1, before the feature ships.

1. Real-time spend controls sit on the authorisation path. A latency problem could cause false declines. Platform supports this work in Q3, and we should launch in stages.

1. Hiring slips further. This doesn't threaten committed dates, but procurement would stay in Q3 and our adoption capacity shrinks.

1. The procurement gate fails. A&P redirects to deeper spend controls and multi-entity policy features, both of which feed card spend.

1. The mobile framework end-of-support date is only "late 2027". The CTO should confirm the exact date.

Decisions we need at the offsite

1. Approve Platform's Q4 loan to Cards, accepting that multi-entity moves to February.
2. Agree the board message on procurement, and the gate criteria behind it.
3. Close the NRR gap. This plan lands about 107% to 110%. Closing the remaining $1.5M to $4M needs commercial levers the CRO and CFO own, such as CS-led card activation, packaging and pricing, and a multi-entity sales motion beyond the 9. Otherwise we tell the board now that 112% is a stretch.
4. Authorise the processor extension request.

Part 1: Roadmap, Q4 2026 to Q3 2027

Planning basis: Five existing squads at 11 squad-weeks a quarter (55 a quarter). The two new squads are counted as zero in the commitments (see the case). Lending between squads is costed at 1.5×. Figures in brackets are squad-weeks of the named squad.

Q4 2026: Protect the card rail, start entities

Q1 2027: Cut over, ship entities, start controls

Q2 2027: Virtual cards, procurement beta

Q3 2027: Launch and land

About 60 of 220 squad-weeks are deliberately uncommitted, mostly in Q3.

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Part 2: The case (≈1,150 words)

The short version

The order is set by one thing we can't negotiate and by the evidence for everything else. The processor retires v1 on 31 March, every authorisation runs through it, and interchange is 58% of revenue. Cards does nothing else until cutover. After that, work is ordered by evidence and cost per squad-week.

The plan gets our exit run-rate to roughly 109–111% NRR, not reliably 112%. We should tell the board that now rather than in Q3.

Why this order

1. v2 first, with real slack. Tom's draft has Cards doing 18 weeks at 11 a quarter, so build finishes around late February. Four weeks of certification then ends around 25 March, about a week before a deadline that would stop all card authorisation. My plan ring-fences Cards in Q4 and has Integrations, which does API work daily, lend 6 weeks (≈4 Cards-weeks). Code is complete in late January, certification runs in February, and we keep about five weeks of slack.

2. Multi-entity next. It has the best evidence we hold. Nine of 14 requesting customers said in writing they'd add subsidiaries, which means ~33 of the 52 subsidiaries, or ~$1.9M ARR. Customer Success's $2.9M assumes all 52 join. The cost is 22 weeks, and it is a direct "more entities" lever.

3. Intacct, then SSO. 17% of customers (~187) use Intacct via CSV and churn at 13% against 7% on NetSuite. If the integration closes that gap, it retains ~$0.9M a year for 9 weeks of work. That assumes average ARR of $78k and that the gap is causal, which is unproven. Intacct also appears in 31% of lost deals. SSO and SCIM costs 5 weeks and covers $1.2M of pipeline plus 11 existing accounts' security reviews. Dynamics is 12 weeks for 3% of customers and 8% of lost deals, and it serves new-logo growth, so it is stretch.

4. Controls before virtual cards. Both need v2 live, so both follow cutover. 31 CFOs asked for real-time controls against 26 for virtual cards. The 4 Approvals & Policy weeks for controls fit in Q1, before procurement takes that squad's capacity. Virtual cards is the only card item we can size: $410M × 10–25% capture × 1.1% ≈ $0.5–1.1M. The $410M is extrapolated from our 60 largest accounts, so it is probably high. This is a judgment call. Swapping the order is cheap, but the Approvals & Policy slot would collide with the procurement build.

5. Procurement: build it, resize the promise. At $8 × 10% of a 700-person company's employees, a customer pays $6,720 a year. Even 100% attach across 1,100 customers is $7.4M, so $6M needs ~890 customers (81%). Two of six design partners would pay (33%), and four already own a procurement tool. At 10–33% attach, year-one ARR is $0.7–2.5M, and with GA in Q3 only a small part lands before Q3 ends. It is still worth building: it is our only new paid module, it recurs, and it matches the board's "more modules" lever. But it is not a path to 112% on its own.

The arithmetic: 8 points of NRR on $86M is ~$6.9M. Sized items total roughly $4–6M of exit run-rate: entities $1.9M, Intacct $0.9M, virtual cards $0.5–1.1M, and procurement $0.7–2.5M (mostly after Q3). Controls and SSO retention are unsized upside. Recognised NRR at Q3 will lag run-rate because late launches haven't ramped.

What I changed from Tom's draft

• New squads count as zero. Last year's three squads took 5, 6 and 8 months from approval to first full sprint, then delivered half capacity in their first quarter. From a September approval, squad A is likely in seat between February and May and squad B later. A realistic ~5 weeks in Q2 and ~11 in Q3 for A, plus ~5 in Q3 for B, is about 22 weeks, against 55 in the draft. Even at Tom's capacity, procurement (36 weeks) couldn't launch in Q2, because squad A would have 22 weeks by the end of Q2.
• Procurement moves to Approvals & Policy. They own the domain and, in the draft, have no work after Q4. Expenses and Platform lend 9 weeks each (≈6 A&P-weeks each) to get a beta by the end of Q2 and GA in Q3. New squads join as upside.
• Mobile moves to Expenses. The draft puts it on squad B, which may not exist until Q3. Expenses has ~38 uncommitted weeks, and the rewrite ships in Q3, ahead of the late-2027 framework cutoff.
• Controls before virtual cards (point 4 above).
• Intacct GA moves from Q4 to Q1 to fund the v2 help. The cost is roughly one quarter of a ~$0.9M-a-year benefit, about $0.2M.
• Q3's "everyone else: adoption" is replaced by a held reserve, because adoption isn't squad work and Q3 launches can't move FY27 NRR much.
• A procurement checkpoint is added at the end of Q1 (see risks).

What we're not doing

• Dynamics, beyond a stretch start in Q2–Q3.
• A Q2 procurement launch, or putting the $6M figure in front of the board.
• Any new Cards scope before cutover.
• A mobile rewrite staffed by a squad that doesn't exist yet.
• Planning on capacity from squads we haven't hired.

Risks that could change the plan

1. Processor timeline. If v2 isn't code-complete by 31 January, Platform joins Cards and controls and virtual cards slip a quarter. Two asks for this month: a written fallback or extension from the processor, and confirmation that feature work behind flags is allowed during the certification freeze (my assumption). Book the certification slot now.
2. Procurement demand. At the end-of-Q1 gate I propose requiring at least 10 signed paid commitments at $8 from ~30 accounts approached (≈$67k ARR). If we miss it, we cut scope and redirect Approvals & Policy and the lenders to multi-entity rollout and card-spend work. The threshold is my proposal and is open to debate.
3. The NRR target itself. Exec decision: hold 112% as a Q3 recognised-NRR target, or restate it as an exit run-rate target, which I think is achievable only with upside from controls and procurement.
4. Evidence quality. The $410M is extrapolated from our largest accounts. The Intacct churn gap is a correlation. The multi-entity sizing rests on 14 of 60 customers. Any could be off by a factor of two.
5. Lending efficiency. The 1.5× penalty is an average. Expenses and Platform have less procurement context, and if they're slower than assumed, GA slips into Q4.
6. Hiring. If squad A lands in February, procurement GA can move earlier. If squad B lands late, nothing in the plan changes.
7. Mobile date. The CTO should confirm the exact end-of-support date and whether an in-place upgrade avoids a 22-week rewrite. Q4's scoping work answers this.

Harbor FY27 roadmap: expand existing customers first

For the planning offsite | Q4 2026–Q3 2027

Recommendation: protect card continuity, unlock committed subsidiary expansion, then bring more existing-customer spend onto Harbor. Treat procurement as a commercial hypothesis to validate—not as committed revenue or a committed launch.

Board outcome: raise NRR from 104% to 112% by the end of Q3 2027. This roadmap supports that goal; the available evidence does not yet establish a credible revenue bridge all the way to 112%.

1. Proposed roadmap

Planning rules

• Commit against the five existing squads, each with 11 squad-weeks per quarter. Neither new squad is on the critical path.
• Numbers below are squad-weeks. Named feature estimates come from the pack; remaining capacity is an allocation ceiling for rollout, validation, hardening or contingency, not an estimate for additional features.
• Cross-squad delivery uses the stated 1.5× cost.
• Adoption work targets expansion and retention in existing accounts. It is not a placeholder for additional module builds.

Critical-path checks

• Processor migration: Q4 delivers 11 Cards weeks + 4 equivalent weeks from Expenses = 15. Q1 delivers the final 3, reaching the required 18. The February certification target creates margin before the hard retirement date.
• Certification freeze: no changes to the certified implementation during the four-week processor window. Before committing dates, confirm the precise freeze scope, book the processor slot and agree cutover acceptance criteria.
• Multi-entity: Approvals & Policy completes its 10 weeks in Q4; Platform completes 11 + 1. Therefore this is a Q1 launch, not a Q4 launch.
• Spend controls: Expenses spends 12 actual weeks across Q2–Q3 to deliver 8 Cards-equivalent weeks; Approvals & Policy supplies its 4 weeks in Q2. Work begins only after v2 is live.
• New squads: plan no committed output until teams are staffed and their ramp is observed. Use initial capacity for bounded adoption, testing or hardening work; allocate larger scope only after a delivery review.

Outcome scorecard

CS, Sales and Finance should turn these into named-account activation targets and a revenue bridge at the offsite. We should not invent conversion forecasts from the current pack.

2. The case for the plan

Why this order

First, protect the revenue engine. Every card authorisation uses an API retiring on 31 March, and interchange represents 58% of revenue. Tom’s migration occupies 18 of Cards’ 22 available weeks across Q4 and Q1, but must also leave four calendar weeks for certification. Quarterly capacity alone does not prove that schedule is safe.

Borrowing six Expenses weeks moves four Cards-equivalent weeks into Q4. That leaves only three planned migration weeks in Q1 and creates room for defects and certification. Receipt matching slips slightly; card continuity takes precedence.

Second, prioritise expansion with identifiable buyers. Multi-entity has the strongest evidence of a concrete expansion action: nine parents have committed in writing. The full 52-subsidiary opportunity is $2.9M ARR, but we cannot treat that total as committed or infer how many subsidiaries the nine parents represent. Launch in Q1, then sell and onboard—not merely ship.

Third, pursue spend expansion in parallel. Virtual cards have a direct connection to software spend currently outside Harbor. Controls address the most frequently expressed card need in the QBRs and may make finance teams comfortable moving more spend onto Harbor. Borrowing Expenses capacity costs four additional squad-weeks versus specialist delivery, but avoids serialising both products through Cards and supports an early-Q3 controls launch.

The $410M software-spend estimate implies a $4.51M annual net-interchange ceiling at 1.1%, before accounting for capture rates, timing or spend that cannot move from invoice to card. It is an opportunity, not a forecast. Both features may affect the same spend; we will not double-count it.

Fourth, remove retention and expansion friction. Intacct serves 17% of existing customers, versus 3% for Dynamics. The 13% versus 7% churn difference is an association, not proof the integration causes better retention, but it supports prioritising Intacct. SSO/SCIM is relatively small and addresses 11 existing-account security reviews. Receipt matching targets the largest expense support problem.

What changes from Tom’s draft

• Hiring no longer funds commitments. Historical time to the first full sprint was five to eight months, with half-capacity delivery in the first quarter. September approvals do not justify a full squad in Q1 and another in Q2. Further, new squads taking specialist work incur the stated transfer cost.
• Migration gains early borrowed capacity and an explicit certification window. Virtual cards no longer competes with the deadline in Q1.
• Multi-entity launches in Q1. Platform’s 12-week estimate exceeds one quarter’s 11-week capacity.
• Procurement moves from committed launch to commercial validation. Its revenue claim is not supported by current evidence.
• Controls gets borrowed delivery capacity. This creates an earlier adoption window without relying on hiring.
• Dynamics and the mobile rewrite leave the committed horizon. The freed capacity supports existing-customer outcomes and schedule resilience.

Why procurement is not the anchor

At the proposed price, an average customer has 70 requester seats and contributes:

70 × $8 × 12 = $6,720 ARR.

Reaching $6M ARR requires approximately 893 average-sized customers—81% of today’s customer base. Only two of six design partners said they would pay; neither is described as a signed commitment. Four already have a competing tool.

The estimated build is 30 Approvals & Policy weeks plus six Integrations weeks, before any additional cross-squad cost. That is too large a bet to anchor this year’s NRR target without stronger evidence.

Validation should seek paid commitments, actual seat counts and evidence of a differentiated switching reason. It is not an unbudgeted production build. A successful gate triggers an explicit investment decision, identifying displaced work and a capacity-backed launch date.

What we are not doing

We are not committing to procurement launch or its $6M claim, Dynamics, or a 22-week mobile rewrite in this horizon. We are also not inventing new feature scope to consume every available week.

The mobile support deadline remains real. By Q3, the CTO must establish the exact end-of-support date and a funded maintenance, upgrade or rewrite path. If continued safe operation requires starting earlier, it returns as a mandatory trade-off—not an assumed new-squad assignment.

Risks that could change the plan

The largest execution risks are processor certification availability, migration work that cannot be delegated, and underestimated multi-entity or controls complexity. Validate the processor work split immediately; any threat to certification displaces discretionary work first.

The largest commercial risk is insufficient expansion capture. At an illustrative $86M opening cohort, an eight-point NRR improvement represents $6.88M more retained/expanded ARR than a 104% outcome. Finance must reconcile the actual cohort and baseline. Even the full multi-entity and software-card opportunity totals only $7.41M before timing, conversion and overlap effects. This plan does not justify promising 112%.

Review the revenue bridge after Q1 launches. Weak activation should shift capacity toward removing proven adoption blockers. Strong paid procurement evidence, an earlier mobile security deadline, or demonstrated new-squad capacity can justify a replan—but none should silently become an assumption today.