Build a roadmap

Harbor FY27 roadmap: expand existing customers first

For the planning offsite | Q4 2026–Q3 2027

Recommendation: protect card continuity, unlock committed subsidiary expansion, then bring more existing-customer spend onto Harbor. Treat procurement as a commercial hypothesis to validate—not as committed revenue or a committed launch.

Board outcome: raise NRR from 104% to 112% by the end of Q3 2027. This roadmap supports that goal; the available evidence does not yet establish a credible revenue bridge all the way to 112%.

1. Proposed roadmap

Planning rules

• Commit against the five existing squads, each with 11 squad-weeks per quarter. Neither new squad is on the critical path.
• Numbers below are squad-weeks. Named feature estimates come from the pack; remaining capacity is an allocation ceiling for rollout, validation, hardening or contingency, not an estimate for additional features.
• Cross-squad delivery uses the stated 1.5× cost.
• Adoption work targets expansion and retention in existing accounts. It is not a placeholder for additional module builds.

Critical-path checks

• Processor migration: Q4 delivers 11 Cards weeks + 4 equivalent weeks from Expenses = 15. Q1 delivers the final 3, reaching the required 18. The February certification target creates margin before the hard retirement date.
• Certification freeze: no changes to the certified implementation during the four-week processor window. Before committing dates, confirm the precise freeze scope, book the processor slot and agree cutover acceptance criteria.
• Multi-entity: Approvals & Policy completes its 10 weeks in Q4; Platform completes 11 + 1. Therefore this is a Q1 launch, not a Q4 launch.
• Spend controls: Expenses spends 12 actual weeks across Q2–Q3 to deliver 8 Cards-equivalent weeks; Approvals & Policy supplies its 4 weeks in Q2. Work begins only after v2 is live.
• New squads: plan no committed output until teams are staffed and their ramp is observed. Use initial capacity for bounded adoption, testing or hardening work; allocate larger scope only after a delivery review.

Outcome scorecard

CS, Sales and Finance should turn these into named-account activation targets and a revenue bridge at the offsite. We should not invent conversion forecasts from the current pack.

2. The case for the plan

Why this order

First, protect the revenue engine. Every card authorisation uses an API retiring on 31 March, and interchange represents 58% of revenue. Tom’s migration occupies 18 of Cards’ 22 available weeks across Q4 and Q1, but must also leave four calendar weeks for certification. Quarterly capacity alone does not prove that schedule is safe.

Borrowing six Expenses weeks moves four Cards-equivalent weeks into Q4. That leaves only three planned migration weeks in Q1 and creates room for defects and certification. Receipt matching slips slightly; card continuity takes precedence.

Second, prioritise expansion with identifiable buyers. Multi-entity has the strongest evidence of a concrete expansion action: nine parents have committed in writing. The full 52-subsidiary opportunity is $2.9M ARR, but we cannot treat that total as committed or infer how many subsidiaries the nine parents represent. Launch in Q1, then sell and onboard—not merely ship.

Third, pursue spend expansion in parallel. Virtual cards have a direct connection to software spend currently outside Harbor. Controls address the most frequently expressed card need in the QBRs and may make finance teams comfortable moving more spend onto Harbor. Borrowing Expenses capacity costs four additional squad-weeks versus specialist delivery, but avoids serialising both products through Cards and supports an early-Q3 controls launch.

The $410M software-spend estimate implies a $4.51M annual net-interchange ceiling at 1.1%, before accounting for capture rates, timing or spend that cannot move from invoice to card. It is an opportunity, not a forecast. Both features may affect the same spend; we will not double-count it.

Fourth, remove retention and expansion friction. Intacct serves 17% of existing customers, versus 3% for Dynamics. The 13% versus 7% churn difference is an association, not proof the integration causes better retention, but it supports prioritising Intacct. SSO/SCIM is relatively small and addresses 11 existing-account security reviews. Receipt matching targets the largest expense support problem.

What changes from Tom’s draft

• Hiring no longer funds commitments. Historical time to the first full sprint was five to eight months, with half-capacity delivery in the first quarter. September approvals do not justify a full squad in Q1 and another in Q2. Further, new squads taking specialist work incur the stated transfer cost.
• Migration gains early borrowed capacity and an explicit certification window. Virtual cards no longer competes with the deadline in Q1.
• Multi-entity launches in Q1. Platform’s 12-week estimate exceeds one quarter’s 11-week capacity.
• Procurement moves from committed launch to commercial validation. Its revenue claim is not supported by current evidence.
• Controls gets borrowed delivery capacity. This creates an earlier adoption window without relying on hiring.
• Dynamics and the mobile rewrite leave the committed horizon. The freed capacity supports existing-customer outcomes and schedule resilience.

Why procurement is not the anchor

At the proposed price, an average customer has 70 requester seats and contributes:

70 × $8 × 12 = $6,720 ARR.

Reaching $6M ARR requires approximately 893 average-sized customers—81% of today’s customer base. Only two of six design partners said they would pay; neither is described as a signed commitment. Four already have a competing tool.

The estimated build is 30 Approvals & Policy weeks plus six Integrations weeks, before any additional cross-squad cost. That is too large a bet to anchor this year’s NRR target without stronger evidence.

Validation should seek paid commitments, actual seat counts and evidence of a differentiated switching reason. It is not an unbudgeted production build. A successful gate triggers an explicit investment decision, identifying displaced work and a capacity-backed launch date.

What we are not doing

We are not committing to procurement launch or its $6M claim, Dynamics, or a 22-week mobile rewrite in this horizon. We are also not inventing new feature scope to consume every available week.

The mobile support deadline remains real. By Q3, the CTO must establish the exact end-of-support date and a funded maintenance, upgrade or rewrite path. If continued safe operation requires starting earlier, it returns as a mandatory trade-off—not an assumed new-squad assignment.

Risks that could change the plan

The largest execution risks are processor certification availability, migration work that cannot be delegated, and underestimated multi-entity or controls complexity. Validate the processor work split immediately; any threat to certification displaces discretionary work first.

The largest commercial risk is insufficient expansion capture. At an illustrative $86M opening cohort, an eight-point NRR improvement represents $6.88M more retained/expanded ARR than a 104% outcome. Finance must reconcile the actual cohort and baseline. Even the full multi-entity and software-card opportunity totals only $7.41M before timing, conversion and overlap effects. This plan does not justify promising 112%.

Review the revenue bridge after Q1 launches. Weak activation should shift capacity toward removing proven adoption blockers. Strong paid procurement evidence, an earlier mobile security deadline, or demonstrated new-squad capacity can justify a replan—but none should silently become an assumption today.

Harbor FY27 Product Roadmap

Prepared by: Staff PM, Harbor For: Executive Team Review (CEO, CFO, CRO, CTO)

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Part 1: The FY27 Roadmap (Q4 2026 – Q3 2027)

Our roadmap is structured into horizons (Now, Next, Later) to account for squad capacity constraints, hiring lead times, and critical infrastructure dependencies. Every initiative directly maps to our core FY27 mandate: raising NRR from 104% to 112%.

NOW (Q4 2026)

Focus: Mandatory infrastructure, unblocking enterprise sales security requirements, and protecting existing revenue.

• Cards Squad (11 squad-weeks):
• Processor v2 API Migration (11/18 sw used): Commencing the mandatory migration off the retiring v1 API.
• Platform Squad (11 squad-weeks):
• SSO and SCIM Provisioning (5 sw): Directly unblocks $1.2M in enterprise pipeline and clears 11 existing account security reviews (CRO request).
• Multi-Entity Foundation (6/12 sw used): Architectural groundwork for parent-subsidiary accounts.
• Integrations Squad (11 squad-weeks):
• Sage Intacct Integration (9 sw): Addresses our highest-churn segment (13% churn vs. 7% on NetSuite) and eliminates a major barrier in lost new-logo deals (31% of losses).
• Spillover buffer (2 sw).
• Expenses Squad (11 squad-weeks):
• Receipt-Matching Improvements (6 sw): Bumps auto-match above 71% to reduce the most common support ticket category.
• Mobile App Rewrite - Phase 1 (5/22 sw used): Early scoping and architecture on the CTO's supported framework upgrade.
• Approvals & Policy Squad (11 squad-weeks):
• Multi-Entity Approval Workflows (10 sw): Pairing with Platform to enable cross-subsidiary governance.
• Spillover buffer (1 sw).

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NEXT (Q1 2027)

Focus: Completing technical debt, launching high-value expansion modules, and integrating critical ERPs.

• Cards Squad (11 squad-weeks):
• Processor v2 API Migration - Completion (7/18 sw used): Finalising code before the March 31 deadline, entering the 4-week certification freeze.
• Virtual Cards for Software Subscriptions - Initiation (4/10 sw used).
• Integrations Squad (11 squad-weeks):
• Microsoft Dynamics Integration (12 sw adjusted to 11 sw capacity via minor scoping): Expanding our enterprise ERP footprint.
• Platform Squad (11 squad-weeks):
• Multi-Entity Support - Completion (6/12 sw used): Finalising multi-subsidiary entity structures.
• Expenses Squad (11 squad-weeks):
• Mobile App Rewrite - Phase 2 (11/22 sw used): Core feature porting and UI overhaul.
• New Squad A (Hired Dec 2026, delivering at ~50% capacity = ~5.5 sw):
• Procurement Module - Phase 1 (5.5/30 sw used): Setting up core purchase requests and initial approval logic.

(Note: During Q1, the card processor runs 4 weeks of certification testing. No changes can be deployed to card flows during this time).

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LATER (Q2 – Q3 2027)

Focus: Unlocking high-margin card spend, launching the flagship procurement add-on, and modernizing mobile infrastructure.

• Q2 2027 (Squads operating at full scale, plus New Squad B onboarding):
• Cards Squad: Virtual Cards for Software Subscriptions (6 sw remaining) & Real-time Spend Controls (8 sw).
• New Squad A (Procurement): Procurement Module - Phase 2 (18 sw total across Q2).
• Expenses Squad: Mobile App Rewrite - Phase 3 / Launch Preparation (11 sw remaining of 22).
• New Squad B (Hiring initiated Q1, arriving Q2, delivering ~5.5 sw): Deployed to accelerate Procurement integrations (Integrations/A&P support).

• Q3 2027 (Fully ramped capacity across 7 squads):
• Cards Squad: Real-time Spend Controls rollout and optimization.
• New Squad A & B: Procurement Module Launch, GA, and initial adoption drives.
• Expenses Squad: Mobile App GA (satisfying CTO's late-2027 framework deprecation timeline).
• Platform / A&P / Integrations: Cross-functional adoption loops for Procurement, Multi-Entity, and Dynamics/Intacct.

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Part 2: The Case for the Roadmap

1. Why This Order? (Balancing Reality and Ambition)

Our mandate is clear: raise NRR to 112% by the end of Q3 2027. To achieve this, we must unlock high-value expansion vectors (Procurement, Virtual Cards, Multi-Entity) while shoring up retention leaks (Sage Intacct churn, mobile app obsolescence, enterprise security blocks).

However, ambition must bow to physics. Tom’s draft roadmap contained a fatal flaw: it assumed new squads would ship code on day one and deliver 100% capacity immediately. Historical data at Harbor proves that newly approved squads take 5 to 8 months to reach their first full sprint and deliver roughly 50% capacity in their first quarter.

Furthermore, Tom’s draft scheduled the Procurement module to launch in Q2 2027 using a brand-new squad. Under realistic hiring timelines (approving the first squad in September means they only start shipping in earnest in Q1 at half-capacity), that timeline was impossible.

We have ordered this roadmap to respect three non-negotiable constraints: 1. The Card Processor Hard Deadline: On March 31, 2027, our processor kills the v1 API. If we do not finish the 18 squad-weeks of migration and the 4-week certification freeze by then, our card processing halts entirely—crushing 58% of our revenue. 2. Realistic Squad Ramp-Up: New Squad A (approved September) is phased in realistically for Q1 (delivering ~5.5 squad-weeks) and hits full stride in Q2. New Squad B is phased in for Q2. 3. Sequence of Dependencies: Virtual Cards and Real-time Spend Controls technically require the v2 API. Therefore, they cannot launch until Q2, immediately following the Q1 v2 migration and certification window.

2. What We Changed from Tom’s Draft and Why

• Shifted Procurement Timelines and Squad Allocation: Tom’s draft had New Squad A building and launching Procurement in Q1/Q2. Given historical hiring lags and the massive scope of Procurement (30 sw for Approvals & Policy + 6 sw for Integrations), we have stretched Procurement development across Q1 (New Squad A partial capacity) and Q2 (full capacity + New Squad B support), targeting a GA in Q3. Trying to rush it in Q2 would result in a broken launch or squad burn-out.
• Shifted Real-Time Spend Controls and Virtual Cards to Q2: Tom scheduled virtual cards in Q1. Because virtual cards and spend controls depend on the v2 API, and the processor locks us out for 4 weeks of certification testing during Q1, these items are now correctly sequenced for Q2 deployment, ensuring zero downtime risk.
• Brought Forward Enterprise Security & Retention Fixes (Q4): We moved SSO/SCIM, Sage Intacct, and receipt-matching improvements into Q4. Why? Because NRR isn't just about selling new modules; it's about stopping the bleeding. Sage Intacct users churn at nearly double the rate of NetSuite users (13% vs 7%), and Intacct blocks 31% of new-logo deals. Fixing this now preserves our base. Similarly, securing $1.2M in enterprise pipeline via SSO/SCIM in Q4 directly supports our growth goals without waiting for unproven modules.

3. What We Are Not Doing (And Why)

To protect focus and deliver on our NRR targets, we are explicitly declining or deferring several candidate items: * Alternative ERP Integrations (Beyond Intacct and Dynamics): While long-tail ERP requests exist, our data shows Intacct (17% of customers, high churn) and Dynamics (enterprise blocker) are the revenue levers that matter. Other ERPs are deferred to FY28. * Ad-Hoc Feature Requests from QBRs: While 26 out of 60 top customers asked for software virtual cards, we are delivering that. However, we are saying no to custom reporting suites and bespoke workflow builders requested by individual accounts until multi-entity and procurement are fully bedded down.

4. Risks That Could Change the Plan

1. Card Processor Certification Delays: * Risk: The processor’s 4-week certification window uncovers critical bugs on our side, forcing us to rewrite v2 migration code during the freeze. * Mitigation: We have front-loaded the 18 squad-weeks of migration work into Q4 and early Q1 to ensure we submit for certification well ahead of the March 31 hard stop. 2. Hiring Velocity for New Squads: * Risk: Tech talent market tightening could delay the onboarding of New Squad A and B engineers. * Mitigation: If hiring slips by a quarter, New Squad B’s intake is dropped, and the Procurement launch slips from late Q2 to mid-Q3. We would backfill critical path items by temporarily reallocating the Platform squad. 3. Procurement Adoption Skepticism: * Risk: Design partner feedback indicates that 4 out of 6 design partners already use dedicated procurement tools and need strong convincing to switch. Tom’s assumption of $6M ARR in Year 1 may be aggressive if attach rates lag. * Mitigation: At $8/user/month (impacting ~10% of employees at a 700-employee average customer = ~$6,700 ARR per customer), we need roughly 90 enterprise customers adopting it in Year 1 to hit the $6M target. Success hinges on Customer Success and Sales enablement, which begins in Q2 alongside build completion.

Part 1: Roadmap, Q4 2026 to Q3 2027

Planning basis: Five existing squads at 11 squad-weeks a quarter (55 a quarter). The two new squads are counted as zero in the commitments (see the case). Lending between squads is costed at 1.5×. Figures in brackets are squad-weeks of the named squad.

Q4 2026: Protect the card rail, start entities

Q1 2027: Cut over, ship entities, start controls

Q2 2027: Virtual cards, procurement beta

Q3 2027: Launch and land

About 60 of 220 squad-weeks are deliberately uncommitted, mostly in Q3.

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Part 2: The case (≈1,150 words)

The short version

The order is set by one thing we can't negotiate and by the evidence for everything else. The processor retires v1 on 31 March, every authorisation runs through it, and interchange is 58% of revenue. Cards does nothing else until cutover. After that, work is ordered by evidence and cost per squad-week.

The plan gets our exit run-rate to roughly 109–111% NRR, not reliably 112%. We should tell the board that now rather than in Q3.

Why this order

1. v2 first, with real slack. Tom's draft has Cards doing 18 weeks at 11 a quarter, so build finishes around late February. Four weeks of certification then ends around 25 March, about a week before a deadline that would stop all card authorisation. My plan ring-fences Cards in Q4 and has Integrations, which does API work daily, lend 6 weeks (≈4 Cards-weeks). Code is complete in late January, certification runs in February, and we keep about five weeks of slack.

2. Multi-entity next. It has the best evidence we hold. Nine of 14 requesting customers said in writing they'd add subsidiaries, which means ~33 of the 52 subsidiaries, or ~$1.9M ARR. Customer Success's $2.9M assumes all 52 join. The cost is 22 weeks, and it is a direct "more entities" lever.

3. Intacct, then SSO. 17% of customers (~187) use Intacct via CSV and churn at 13% against 7% on NetSuite. If the integration closes that gap, it retains ~$0.9M a year for 9 weeks of work. That assumes average ARR of $78k and that the gap is causal, which is unproven. Intacct also appears in 31% of lost deals. SSO and SCIM costs 5 weeks and covers $1.2M of pipeline plus 11 existing accounts' security reviews. Dynamics is 12 weeks for 3% of customers and 8% of lost deals, and it serves new-logo growth, so it is stretch.

4. Controls before virtual cards. Both need v2 live, so both follow cutover. 31 CFOs asked for real-time controls against 26 for virtual cards. The 4 Approvals & Policy weeks for controls fit in Q1, before procurement takes that squad's capacity. Virtual cards is the only card item we can size: $410M × 10–25% capture × 1.1% ≈ $0.5–1.1M. The $410M is extrapolated from our 60 largest accounts, so it is probably high. This is a judgment call. Swapping the order is cheap, but the Approvals & Policy slot would collide with the procurement build.

5. Procurement: build it, resize the promise. At $8 × 10% of a 700-person company's employees, a customer pays $6,720 a year. Even 100% attach across 1,100 customers is $7.4M, so $6M needs ~890 customers (81%). Two of six design partners would pay (33%), and four already own a procurement tool. At 10–33% attach, year-one ARR is $0.7–2.5M, and with GA in Q3 only a small part lands before Q3 ends. It is still worth building: it is our only new paid module, it recurs, and it matches the board's "more modules" lever. But it is not a path to 112% on its own.

The arithmetic: 8 points of NRR on $86M is ~$6.9M. Sized items total roughly $4–6M of exit run-rate: entities $1.9M, Intacct $0.9M, virtual cards $0.5–1.1M, and procurement $0.7–2.5M (mostly after Q3). Controls and SSO retention are unsized upside. Recognised NRR at Q3 will lag run-rate because late launches haven't ramped.

What I changed from Tom's draft

• New squads count as zero. Last year's three squads took 5, 6 and 8 months from approval to first full sprint, then delivered half capacity in their first quarter. From a September approval, squad A is likely in seat between February and May and squad B later. A realistic ~5 weeks in Q2 and ~11 in Q3 for A, plus ~5 in Q3 for B, is about 22 weeks, against 55 in the draft. Even at Tom's capacity, procurement (36 weeks) couldn't launch in Q2, because squad A would have 22 weeks by the end of Q2.
• Procurement moves to Approvals & Policy. They own the domain and, in the draft, have no work after Q4. Expenses and Platform lend 9 weeks each (≈6 A&P-weeks each) to get a beta by the end of Q2 and GA in Q3. New squads join as upside.
• Mobile moves to Expenses. The draft puts it on squad B, which may not exist until Q3. Expenses has ~38 uncommitted weeks, and the rewrite ships in Q3, ahead of the late-2027 framework cutoff.
• Controls before virtual cards (point 4 above).
• Intacct GA moves from Q4 to Q1 to fund the v2 help. The cost is roughly one quarter of a ~$0.9M-a-year benefit, about $0.2M.
• Q3's "everyone else: adoption" is replaced by a held reserve, because adoption isn't squad work and Q3 launches can't move FY27 NRR much.
• A procurement checkpoint is added at the end of Q1 (see risks).

What we're not doing

• Dynamics, beyond a stretch start in Q2–Q3.
• A Q2 procurement launch, or putting the $6M figure in front of the board.
• Any new Cards scope before cutover.
• A mobile rewrite staffed by a squad that doesn't exist yet.
• Planning on capacity from squads we haven't hired.

Risks that could change the plan

1. Processor timeline. If v2 isn't code-complete by 31 January, Platform joins Cards and controls and virtual cards slip a quarter. Two asks for this month: a written fallback or extension from the processor, and confirmation that feature work behind flags is allowed during the certification freeze (my assumption). Book the certification slot now.
2. Procurement demand. At the end-of-Q1 gate I propose requiring at least 10 signed paid commitments at $8 from ~30 accounts approached (≈$67k ARR). If we miss it, we cut scope and redirect Approvals & Policy and the lenders to multi-entity rollout and card-spend work. The threshold is my proposal and is open to debate.
3. The NRR target itself. Exec decision: hold 112% as a Q3 recognised-NRR target, or restate it as an exit run-rate target, which I think is achievable only with upside from controls and procurement.
4. Evidence quality. The $410M is extrapolated from our largest accounts. The Intacct churn gap is a correlation. The multi-entity sizing rests on 14 of 60 customers. Any could be off by a factor of two.
5. Lending efficiency. The 1.5× penalty is an average. Expenses and Platform have less procurement context, and if they're slower than assumed, GA slips into Q4.
6. Hiring. If squad A lands in February, procurement GA can move earlier. If squad B lands late, nothing in the plan changes.
7. Mobile date. The CTO should confirm the exact end-of-support date and whether an in-place upgrade avoids a 22-week rewrite. Q4's scoping work answers this.