Price and package a product

To: CEO From: Head of Product Re: Alternative to a 30% January increase

Recommendation

Don't apply a flat 30%. Move pricing from seats with unlimited pages to a model that charges for pages. Self-serve keeps seats but adds an included page allowance and a per-page overage. Enterprise moves to a committed per-page rate at renewal. At current usage, this takes gross margin from 24% to about 53%.

Tom's increase would not get us to 41%. That figure assumes all contracts reprice in January, and only one enterprise contract renews then. Self-serve-only in January gives about 34%.

What the data says

• The margin problem is enterprise. Six contracts account for 71% of pages (19.4M of 27.4M) and 71% of serving cost ($23.2k of $32.9k a month). They pay $19.0k, so they lose $4.2k a month (−22%). Four of six are negative.
• Enterprise pays too little per page. Effective rates run $0.0007 to $0.0015 per page against a serving cost of $0.0012. Seat pricing lets page volume grow without any increase in what we charge. Northwind's pages tripled in a year and its bill didn't move.
• Self-serve is healthy. It runs at 60% margin. Startups are at 87%, and mid-market is at 40%, dragged down by heavy accounts. Q and P are negative.
• We are far below market. DocuLens lists at $0.012 per page up to 1M and $0.008 above, plus a $500 platform fee. At that list price, Northwind's 4.8M pages would cost about $43k a month, against our $3.2k. Enterprise discounts narrow this gap, but not by much.

Proposed model

• Self-serve: $99 per seat per month, including 25,000 pages per seat. $0.002 per page above that. Seats stay because they are simple and match Formwise. Our overage rate is one-fifth of Formwise's $0.01.
• Enterprise: a committed monthly page volume at $0.002 per page, with overage at the same rate. No seat fee. Offered on two-year terms with a price lock.
• Floor: $0.0017 per page. Anything below it needs CEO sign-off.

Because serving cost is falling about 10% a quarter, a locked rate becomes more profitable each quarter. If that holds, enterprise margin reaches about 60% within a year at current volume.

Effect by segment

Monthly run-rate at current usage, before churn, at $0.0012 per page.

Gross margin dollars rise from $10.2k to $36.9k a month. Startups barely change because most use less than 25k pages per seat. Mid-market carries the most self-serve risk: a few heavy accounts see large increases, such as Q ($594 to $1,382) and T ($792 to $1,498).

Getting there

Self-serve. Announce in January and take effect February 1 with 30 days' notice. New sign-ups get the new model immediately. For existing heavy mid-market accounts, cap the increase at 50% for the first three months. Offer annual prepay as an option.

Enterprise, by renewal date. No contract is repriced mid-term.

• Copperfield (January 2027): $0.002 per page takes it from $2.4k to about $4.8k a month. This is the first test of the model.
• Northwind (February 2027): Its ask is "two years at the same rate." At the same dollar amount, the effective rate would fall to about $0.0007 per page while volume triples. Counter with a two-year term, a committed 4.8M pages a month, $0.0017 in year one, and $0.002 in year two. That is about $8.2k a month in year one. Trade the rate for term and commitment. If they refuse to go below $0.0017, let them walk. They lose us $2.6k a month today, and losing them would improve gross margin dollars.
• Arcadia (March 2027): It is evaluating a competitor and is the only enterprise account with positive margin ($528 a month). Offer $0.002, benchmark against ExtractIQ at their volume, and concede only down to the floor and only on a multi-year deal.
• Halden (June), Meridian (September), Brightwater (November): standard $0.002.

The price test

The test's B arm was $129 against $99, which is a 30% increase. That makes it the most relevant evidence we have, and it doesn't support the January increase.

• The result is inconclusive. Conversion was 5.0% against 4.8%. The 95% interval on the difference is roughly −1.7 to +2.1 points. That interval can't rule out losing a third of conversion. "Not significant" does not mean "no effect."
• The assignment looks broken. The arms received 1,240 and 870 visitors against a 50/50 design. That is a sample-ratio mismatch (chi-square ≈ 65). Until someone explains it, we can't trust either arm.
• Its scope is narrow. It ran two weeks over the holidays, measured new sign-ups only, and counted first payments only. It says nothing about existing customers, seat expansion, churn, or heavy page users.

We shouldn't cite it as cover. Rerun it properly: a six-week randomized 50/50 test of the new model on new sign-ups, plus a notice-based read on existing self-serve accounts.

Why not 30% across the board

• It doesn't fix enterprise. A 30% increase moves enterprise from −22% to about 6% margin. Even then, it can't be applied mid-term.
• Seats don't track cost. Serving cost is about $13 per seat for startups and about $480 per seat for Northwind. A per-seat increase raises both sides equally and leaves the mismatch in place.
• It taxes the wrong customers. Light users absorb the same percentage increase as heavy users, while the heavy users are the ones we under-recover on.

Risks

• Enterprise pushback. A roughly 2x jump at renewal is the real risk. Expect one or two losses. The two-year lock and staggered renewal calendar limit the damage.
• Cost decline stalls. If serving cost stops falling, the $0.0017 floor needs review each quarter.
• Usage shifts. Heavy self-serve users may trim usage to avoid overage. That is acceptable given the margin, but we should watch conversion closely.

Decisions requested

1. Reject the flat 30% increase.
2. Approve the self-serve model effective February 1, with a 90-day cap for heavy mid-market accounts.
3. Approve the enterprise per-page rate card, with a $0.0017 floor and CEO sign-off required below it.
4. Rerun the price test properly before any new-signup price change.

Recommendation to the CEO

Reject the blanket January increase. Replace unlimited-page seat pricing with a platform fee plus metered pages, and migrate enterprise accounts at contractual renewal. Validate the proposed rates before broad rollout; the December test does not establish willingness to pay for this model.

The problem is the pricing metric, not simply the price level. Dashboard seats do not track extraction value or cost. Six enterprise accounts generate 19.36 million pages—71% of all usage—but lose $4,232 a month at today’s costs. Meanwhile, small startups subsidize heavy users.

Across all 80 accounts, current monthly revenue is $43,057, cost to serve is $32,903, and gross margin is 23.6%, consistent with Tom’s reported 24%.

Proposed model and customer impact

Include unlimited dashboard users. Charge for successfully processed pages, with clear definitions for multipage documents, retries and failures. The calculations below assume exported pages are billable; validate that assumption before launch.

These are static, fully migrated scenarios, not forecasts: they assume unchanged usage, no churn and today’s exported costs. Monthly gross profit rises from $10,154 to $94,073. A further 10% cost reduction would raise proposed gross margin to approximately 76.7%, but we should not depend on it.

The startup revenue reduction is deliberate: remove the collaboration tax and preserve an accessible entry point. Heavy users should fund their own consumption.

The rates are plausible hypotheses, not proven willingness to pay. Our $0.006 self-serve rate is below the published competitor page rates; enterprise at $0.004 is half DocuLens’s published high-volume rate before platform fees. Those comparisons require fresh verification and equivalent accuracy, features and service levels.

Why not Tom’s approach?

At unchanged usage, a universal 30% increase produces $55,974 monthly revenue and 41.2% gross margin. It restores the historical aggregate margin but leaves the structural problem intact:

• Enterprise gross margin remains only 5.9%.
• Northwind and Halden remain loss-making.
• Growing page volume can erase the improvement without adding seats.
• Low-volume customers pay more despite being highly profitable already.
• Existing enterprise contracts cannot simply be repriced in January without contractual authority or agreement.

Our alternative is economically stronger, but its large mid-market and enterprise increases create meaningful retention risk. We must test that risk rather than treat modeled revenue as secured.

Migration and enterprise renewals

January: launch metering and shadow invoices, not a forced universal increase. Instrument billable pages, audit costs and billing, and show customers their projected bills. Provide usage forecasts, threshold alerts and optional spend limits; do not silently interrupt production workflows.

For new self-serve customers, pilot the model after repairing experimentation. For existing self-serve customers, provide at least 90 days’ notice, subject to applicable terms. Offer a six-month, explicitly expiring migration credit for large increases. Publish both discounted and eventual bills so credits do not disguise the destination price. Separate price effects from usage growth in reporting.

For enterprise, honor existing agreements until renewal unless customers voluntarily amend. Proposed first-renewal pricing is $500 + $0.003/page for 12 months, stepping to $0.004 in year two. Even the transitional rate produces approximately 62% enterprise gross margin at current usage and cost.

Renewal sequence, with monthly-equivalent first-year prices:

• Copperfield, January 2027: $7,640; begin negotiations immediately.
• Northwind, February: $14,960. Reject two years of unlimited usage “at the same rate.” Offer two-year rate certainty only against a defined page commitment, with paid excess usage. Its threefold volume growth makes this essential.
• Arcadia, March: $10,430. Start an executive-led retention discussion now; benchmark extraction quality and switching economics before conceding price.
• Halden, June: $12,380.
• Meridian, September: $6,950.
• Brightwater, November: $8,720.

Commitments should reflect validated usage and seasonality, with transparent true-ups and no unlimited overage loophole. Do not promise that renewal discounts are permanent. Escalate concessions below our margin floor to Finance and Product jointly.

Revenue will ramp through these renewals and subsequent step-ups, not jump to the table’s total in January. Build the forecast account by account, including churn, credits and volume scenarios.

One data issue needs resolution first: enterprise revenue per listed seat exceeds $99, despite the pricing document describing discounted seat rates. Use observed revenue for this analysis, but reconcile actual contract units and entitlements before quoting renewals.

What the price test actually says

The intended 50/50 allocation produced 1,240 versus 870 visitors. That is severe sample-ratio mismatch: approximately χ² = 64.9, p < 10⁻¹⁴ under equal allocation. Investigate assignment, exposure logging, eligibility, channel mix and exclusions before trusting the causal result.

Observed conversion was 5.00% versus 4.83%. Ignoring the allocation problem, the difference is approximately −0.17 percentage points, with a rough 95% interval of −2.04 to +1.70 points. “Not statistically significant” does not establish equivalence or rule out commercially material harm.

It also tested only new self-serve sign-ups, over two weeks—not existing customers, retention, enterprise renewals or usage-based pricing.

Repair the experiment, predefine a commercially meaningful conversion-loss threshold, and measure revenue per eligible visitor, paid activation, retention, usage and contribution margin. Use evidence to choose pricing—not the test as cover for a predetermined increase.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief Executive Officer FROM: Head of Product, Parsewell DATE: October 24, 2024 SUBJECT: Alternative Pricing Model vs. Tom’s 30% Across-the-Board Increase

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1. Assessment of the Growth Team’s Price Test

Tom’s reliance on the December price test to justify a blanket 30% price hike is dangerously flawed. The test suffered from two fatal errors: 1. Sample Selection & Volume Discrepancy: Arm A ($99) attracted 1,240 visitors, while Arm B ($129) attracted only 870 visitors—a 30% drop in top-of-funnel capture. This points to a broken traffic allocation or immediate audience suppression at the higher price point. 2. Confounding Variables: Running a pricing test during December (8th–21st) captures holiday-shortened enterprise/developer activity, creating noise that masks true price elasticity.

While a 30% seat price increase showed a statistically insignificant conversion dip over a two-week window, applying that logic to usage or enterprise contracts ignores reality. Parsewell is an infrastructure API. Developers do not buy seats for fun; they buy seats to build systems that process millions of pages. Tying our revenue strictly to developer seats while our core cost driver—and customer value metric—is document volume is a structural mismatch.

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2. The Current State: Margin Erosion & Value Leakage

An analysis of our usage export reveals why Tom is panicking about gross margins (currently sitting at roughly 24% overall): * The Enterprise Subsidy: Our 6 Enterprise accounts processed 19.16 million pages last month (79% of total company volume) but generated only $18,600 in revenue. Because they enjoy "unlimited pages" tied to discounted seat licenses, their heavy usage swamps our inference costs ($0.0012/page). Consequently, 4 out of 6 Enterprise accounts have negative gross margins, costing us thousands monthly (e.g., Northwind Logistics loses $2,584/month). * The Self-Serve Engine: Mid-market and Startup tiers are healthy, generating positive gross margins because their volume scales predictably with seat counts.

A flat 30% seat hike fixes nothing for Enterprise: adding 30% to Northwind’s $3,200/month bill reduces their negative margin, but they still bleed cash because they process 4.8 million pages for a flat fee.

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3. The Alternative Pricing Model: Value-Based Usage Tiers

To fix gross margins structurally, we must decouple our monetization from developer seats and align it with the metric that drives our costs and customer value: processed pages.

We propose launching Parsewell V2 on January 1: 1. Self-Serve (Startups & Mid-market): Retain the base seat fee ($99/seat/month) to cover dashboard access, but introduce a generous included page allowance (50,000 pages/seat/month) with a clear, predictable overage rate of $0.005 per page. 2. Enterprise Contracts: Move away from flat seat-license bundles. Transition to a Platform Fee + Usage Model modeled after industry standards (competing with DocuLens/ExtractIQ): * Base Platform Fee: $1,500/month (includes dashboard, SSO, priority support, and 250k pages). * Overage / Metered Rate: $0.008 per page for all volume exceeding the base allowance.

#### Financial Impact Summary (Based on Last 30 Days Data) * Current Monthly Revenue: ~$41,000 | Current Cost to Serve: ~$31,000 | Current Gross Margin: ~24% * New Model Monthly Revenue: ~$81,500 | New Cost to Serve: ~$31,000 | New Gross Margin: ~62%

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4. Segment-by-Segment Impact & Table

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5. Execution Strategy & Enterprise Renewals

Transitioning self-serve is straightforward via a Stripe billing update with a 30-day grandfathering notice. Enterprise renewals require a tactical playbook to prevent churn, especially with accounts like Arcadia Health evaluating competitors.

• Copperfield Freight (Renews Jan 2027): Their contract is up immediately in January. We will introduce the new usage-based framework during December QBR. Position the $0.008/page rate against competitor DocuLens ($0.012/page) to show they are still getting a volume discount.
• Northwind Logistics (Renews Feb 2027): They want a 2-year renewal at the same rate despite a 3x volume surge. Do not accept. Counter-offer: Honor the flat seat rate for 12 months only if they agree to a volume cap of 2M pages/month, with overages billed at $0.008/page thereafter. Otherwise, transition them directly to the new platform + usage model.
• Arcadia Health (Renews Mar 2027 - Evaluating Competitor): Because they are price-sensitive and shopping around, offer a transitional "Volume Partnership Discount": a lower platform fee ($1,000) for Q1 while locking them into a 2-year tiered page commitment.

Conclusion

Tom wants a blunt instrument (30% across the board) to solve a surgical problem. A flat 30% price hike leaves money on the table for high-volume users while alienating self-serve customers. Our value-based usage model repairs our gross margins to over 60%, prices our heavy enterprise users fairly based on the compute power they consume, and keeps us competitively positioned against ExtractIQ and DocuLens.